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ABSTRACT 
The Personal Router is a mobile communication device developed by the Advanced Network 
Architecture group at the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science. The Personal Router is able to 
select and negotiate connectivity with local providers for different kinds of services and 
interfaces. It needs payment procedures to support these services. As this device is designed to be 
used in many distinct unpredictable contexts, it cannot implement a single payment system. The 
complexity of existing payment systems has to be mapped into this new environment. A different 
payment system must be chosen each time, depending on many variables such as costs, 
environmental constraints, privacy, user and provider’s needs and preferences.  
 
Privacy is a major issue for this device. In effect, getting wireless and mobile service everywhere 
will possibly leave an easily traceable trail; moreover, using this device supposes negotiating with 
many different untrusted providers and paying for the service. This can create huge potential 
threats for privacy and personal data management if this issue is not included in the early stage of 
the design.  
 
Legal requirements and user preferences and expectations for privacy in electronic transactions 
are therefore explored. Past attempts to enhance privacy in different environments are examined. 
Reasons why most of them have failed and some of them are struggling to stay alive are analyzed. 
New privacy threats faced by the Personal Router are considered. 
 
A new approach based on building blocks is made. Payment systems are split into primitive 
operations; each of them implements one step of a transaction. The combination of these building 
blocks replicates a payment protocol. The characteristics of a payment system can then be derived 
from the analysis of the implementation of each of these primitives. Users’  preferences are 
defined by attributes. Payment systems can then be compared through their primitives and even 
slightly modified to be closer to users’  ideal system by altering the primitives. The modular 
approach makes this easier. This framework is successfully tested on three major electronic 
payment systems. Several limitations of this approach and open issues related to the Personal 
Router are exposed. 
 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Sharon Gillett 
Title:  Research Associate, Center for Technology, Policy and Industrial Development 
 
Thesis Supervisor: John Wroclawski 
Title:  Research Scientist, Laboratory for Computer Science 
 - 4 - 
 - 5 - 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis was completed with intellectual and financial support from the Center for 
Technology, Policy and Industrial Development (CTPID). I gratefully acknowledge the 
support of the industrial sponsors of the MIT Program on Internet and Telecoms 
Convergence (ITC), listed at http://itc.mit.edu. This thesis was written thanks to the 
generous contribution of time, advice, patient guidance and encouragements of my 
supervisors Sharon Gillett and John Wroclawski. The discussions I had with both of them 
helped me to navigate to the end of this work. I would like to add special thanks to 
Sharon for her trust, her dynamism, for the time she always found to help and guide her 
students and for these two years I spent with ITC. I would also like to thank the entire 
team of ITC, fellow ITC research assistants and the students from TPP for their support 
and friendship.  
 
I want to thank the Advanced Network Architecture group at the Laboratory for 
Computer Science for their warm welcome throughout the year. In particular, I am 
grateful to George Lee, who helped me draw the framework described in this thesis, and 
Dina Katabi, who accepted me in her office in NE43 during this year.  
My experience here at MIT has been wonderful. I had the chance to meet people from all 
over the world and to live in a very stimulating environment. I will leave a lot of friends 
here in Boston, and I hope we will stay in touch.  
 
Finally, Family and friends provided an invaluable support throughout my time at MIT. I 
want to acknowledge the constant encouragements I received from France, in particular 
from my mother Catherine, and from my two brothers Benoist and Matthieu. In Boston, 
all my friends have been very encouraging and supportive, particularly my roommates 
Vincent, David and Guillaume who spent the year with me and with whom I traveled as 
far as our good old Oldsmobile Delta 88 Royale would take us. 
I would also like to give special thanks to Carol for her patience and for letting me spend 
these two years in Boston.  
 
 
 - 6 - 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 3 
Acknowledgements 5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 6 
List of Figures 10 
List of Tables 11 
1 INTRODUCTION 13 
1.1 Context 13 
1.1.1 The Personal Router 13 
1.1.2 Payment issues 15 
1.1.3 Privacy 15 
1.2 Approach to payment systems 17 
1.2.1 Definition of the problem 17 
1.2.2 Related work 17 
1.2.3 The approach chosen 18 
 - 7 - 
1.2.4 Results 20 
2 THE RICHNESS OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS 23 
2.1 Definitions 23 
2.1.1 Transactions 23 
2.1.2 Stakeholders 25 
2.2 Characteristics of payment schemes 26 
2.2.1 Exchange model 27 
2.2.2 Hardware 28 
2.2.3 Authorization 29 
2.2.4 Utilization model 30 
2.2.5 Central Authority 30 
2.2.6 Transaction costs 31 
2.2.7 Payment Values 32 
2.2.8 Elemental payment properties 33 
2.2.9 System security 35 
2.2.10 Costs 37 
2.2.11 Active / passive payment 41 
2.2.12 Visible / invisible payment 43 
2.2.13 Privacy 43 
2.3 Transaction Models for the Personal Router 47 
2.3.1 Introduction 47 
2.3.2 Business opportunities 47 
2.3.3 Definitions 48 
2.3.4 Direct transaction between the user and the provider 48 
2.3.5 Transactions through brokers 49 
2.3.6 Bribes 52 
2.3.7 Distinct groups of users 53 
2.3.8 Summary: transaction models 54 
 - 8 - 
2.4 Summary 54 
3 PRIVACY 55 
3.1 Definitions 56 
3.1.1 A definition of privacy 56 
3.1.2 Stakeholders 58 
3.2 Background: Privacy in the Law 60 
3.2.1 Privacy in the U.S. constitution 60 
3.2.2 The Privacy Act of 1974 61 
3.2.3 Privacy in Europe 62 
3.3 Privacy issues raised by the Personal Router 65 
3.3.1 Threat of leaving a trail over insecure networks 66 
3.3.2 Threats in electronic transactions 74 
3.3.3 Threats in wireless communications 77 
3.4 Conclusion: Privacy and the Personal Router 79 
4 PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR THE PERSONAL ROUTER 81 
4.1 Introduction to primitive operations 82 
4.2 Selection of a payment scheme: attributes 83 
4.2.1 Definition 84 
4.2.2 Attributes of both primitives and complete payment schemes 85 
4.2.3 Attributes of the complete system 90 
4.2.4 Use of the attributes 91 
4.3 Description of Payments with Primitive Elements 91 
4.3.1 Primitive objects 91 
4.3.2 Primitive operations 93 
4.4 Selection process 109 
 - 9 - 
4.5 Summary 110 
5 RESULTS / EXAMPLES 111 
5.1 DigiCash 112 
5.1.1 Quick technical overview of DigiCash 112 
5.1.2 Primitives of a DigiCash payment system 113 
5.1.3 Examples of modifications of these primitives 119 
5.1.4 Summary 120 
5.2 Credit Cards 121 
5.2.1 Description of the scheme 121 
5.2.2 Primitives of an online credit card transaction 124 
5.2.3 Summary 131 
5.3 PayPal 133 
5.3.1 Primitives of a PayPal transaction 135 
5.3.2 Summary 139 
5.4 Conclusions 140 
6 CONCLUSION 143 
6.1 Findings 143 
6.2 Future Research and Open Issues 146 
7 BIBLIOGRAPHY 149 
7.1 Articles 149 
7.2 Web sites 152 
7.3 General Background 153 
 
 - 10 - 
List of Figures 
FIGURE 2-1: DEFINITION OF A TRANSACTION IN FOUR STEPS 24 
FIGURE 2-2: DIRECT TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE USER AND THE 
PROVIDER 49 
FIGURE 2-3: SIMPLIFIED MODEL: ONE BROKER 50 
FIGURE 2-4: SEVERAL BROKERS 52 
FIGURE 2-5: BRIBES 52 
FIGURE 2-6: DISTINCT GROUP OF USERS 53 
FIGURE 3-1: DIFFERENT LEVELS OF INTERACTION WITH THE PERSONAL 
ROUTER 65 
FIGURE 3-2: A DESCRIPTION OF THE LPWA SCHEME 72 
FIGURE 4-1: DIAGRAM OF PRIMITIVE AUTHENTICATION 94 
FIGURE 4-2: DIAGRAM OF PRIMITIVE AUTHORIZATION 98 
FIGURE 4-3: DIAGRAM OF PRIMITIVE TRANSFER, DIFFERENTIATED AS 
“TRANSFER-OUT” AND “TRANSFER-IN” 102 
FIGURE 4-4: DIAGRAM OF PRIMITIVE RECORD KEEPING 105 
FIGURE 4-5: DIAGRAM OF PRIMITIVE AGGREGATION 108 
FIGURE 4-6: DIAGRAM OF PRIMITIVE TIMING 109 
FIGURE 5-1: THE DIGICASH SCHEME 113 
FIGURE 5-2: THE DIGICASH PRIMITIVES 114 
FIGURE 5-3: WITHDRAWAL OF COINS IN DIGICASH WITH PRIMITIVES 115 
FIGURE 5-4: THE CREDIT CARD SCHEME 123 
FIGURE 5-5: PRIMITIVES IN THE CREDIT CARD SCHEME 124 
FIGURE 5-6: THE PAYPAL SCHEME 134 
FIGURE 5-7: THE PAYPAL PRIMITIVES 135 
 
 - 11 - 
List of Tables  
TABLE 2-1: PRIVACY CHARACTERISTICS OF A REAL CASH TRANSACTION 46 
TABLE 4-1: ATTRIBUTES OF PRIMITIVE AUTHENTICATION 97 
TABLE 4-2: PRIVACY CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIMITIVE AUTHENTICATION97 
TABLE 4-3: ATTRIBUTES OF PRIMITIVE AUTHORIZATION 100 
TABLE 4-4: ATTRIBUTES OF PRIMITIVE TRANSFER 104 
TABLE 4-5: ATTRIBUTES OF PRIMITIVE RECORD KEEPING 106 
TABLE 5-1: PRIMITIVES’ ATTRIBUTES OF A DIGICASH PAYER 116 
TABLE 5-2: PRIMITIVES’ ATTRIBUTES OF A DIGICASH PAYEE 118 
TABLE 5-3: PRIVACY CHARACTERISTICS OF A DIGICASH TRANSACTION 119 
TABLE 5-4: PRIMITIVES’ ATTRIBUTES OF A DIGICASH PAYER 120 
TABLE 5-5: ATTRIBUTES OF PRIMITIVE AUTHENTICATION 126 
TABLE 5-6: ATTRIBUTES OF PRIMITIVE AUTHORIZATION 127 
TABLE 5-7: ATTRIBUTES OF PRIMITIVE TRANSFER 128 
TABLE 5-8: PRIVACY CHARACTERISTICS IF TRANSFER IS ENCRYPTED OR 
NOT ENCRYPTED 129 
TABLE 5-9: ATTRIBUTES OF RECORD KEEPING 130 
TABLE 5-10: ATTRIBUTES OF A CREDIT CARD TRANSACTION FOR THE 
PAYER 131 
TABLE 5-11: ATTRIBUTES OF A CREDIT CARD TRANSACTION FOR THE 
MERCHANT 132 
TABLE 5-12: PRIVACY CHARACTERISTICS A THE CREDIT CARD SYSTEM 132 
TABLE 5-13: ATTRIBUTES OF PRIMITIVE AUTHENTICATION 136 
TABLE 5-14: PRIVACY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRANSFER PRIMITIVE OF 
PAYPAL 137 
TABLE 5-15: ATTRIBUTES OF RECORD KEEPING 138 
TABLE 5-16: ATTRIBUTES OF PAYPAL 139 
TABLE 5-17: PRIVACY CHARACTERISTICS OF PAYPAL 139 
TABLE 5-18: COMPARISONS OF ATTRIBUTES OF DIGICASH, CREDIT CARDS 
AND PAYPAL 140 
 - 12 - 
 
 
 - 13 - 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Context 
1.1.1 The Personal Router 
The Personal Router (Clark and Wroclawski, 2001) is a mobile communication device 
currently under development at the Advanced Network Architecture group (ANA) at the 
Laboratory for Computer Science (LCS). 
The aim of this device is to study a new paradigm and a new market model for mobile 
communications. The motivation for this project comes from two main observations on 
today’ s mobile markets and technologies. First, there is no middle point between a fixed 
wireless network, local to a physical entity, and a national or regional mobile 
communication system such as cellular networks. There is enough space in between for 
other market models, such as local providers offering service locally with short-time 
contracts. The other observation is that today’ s devices are limited by a restricted set of 
interfaces and wireless modules. Cell phones, 802.11b wireless, pagers, use different 
frequencies and interfaces. Technically and contractually, they cannot interact with each 
other. Therefore, the different markets for each of these devices are locked and do not 
compete. Opening interfaces and devices could create a new paradigm and more 
competition. 
 
  Chapter 1 
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The Personal Router is the result of these considerations. Technically, it is able to interact 
with a wide variety of incompatible wireless services and interfaces. It can access these 
different networks on behalf of other personal digital devices carried by the user; these 
devices would all be linked together by a personal area network such as Bluetooth. For 
instance, a PDA trying to download emails would do it through the Personal Router, 
which would be in charge of finding the best network available for this task.  
This responsibility requires tools to match different kinds of services (defined in terms of 
price, bandwidth, quality of service, delay) with the requirements and rules of the 
application and of the user. The Personal Router would then be able to negotiate and to 
make a payment for the chosen service. The user and the provider would subsequently be 
bound by a very short-term contract.  
 
The goal of this research led by the Advanced Network Architecture group is dual. The 
first is to show that a new wireless communications market paradigm is technically 
possible. The second is to develop a framework for access to wireless services and 
automated negotiation for these services.  
The Personal Router has the potential to change the market of mobile 
telecommunications. As we have seen in the past, it is almost impossible to anticipate 
perfectly the new direction that this market will follow after the introduction of this 
innovation. Therefore, the goal is not to foresee the future, but to make everything 
possible for it to happen. Therefore, the design process if the Personal Router is 
intentionally open, to allow unpredictable orientations of the technology and of the 
market.  
Today’ s forms of the wireless market are still possible in this new environment. Contracts 
could last longer than a few seconds or minutes, and provider can be larger than a few 
antennas in a local area. For instance, cellular networks operator could still provide long-
term contracts and wide area coverage for a flat rate. The aim of this project is to create 
new business opportunity and to offer a new paradigm for the market of mobile 
communications. 
Introduction   
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1.1.2 Payment issues 
The Personal Router is able to select and negotiate connectivity with local providers for 
different kinds of services and interfaces. It will buy an intangible good: connectivity and 
network services. The goal is therefore to support a wide range of payment models for 
these services. The Personal Router model also implies that a very large number of 
providers will interact with a very large number of users. These interactions will be 
primarily network services. The Personal Router needs payment procedures to support 
these services. As this device is designed to be used in many distinct unpredictable 
contexts, the possibility to use a fixed number of predefined payment systems is likely to 
limit the spectrum of possible usage and the overall flexibility of the system. 
In the “ real world,”  users have different payment systems available to them, like cash, 
credit card, checks, or money order. These payment systems are not interchangeable. 
They have diverse properties, and that is why a particular user will prefer to pay by cash 
or by credit card for a particular good. This choice is made consciously for real objective 
reasons, or maybe unconsciously, because of habits.  
It is very likely that this behavior will repeat itself in the electronic world. Depending on 
the context, users will have various sets of requirements to conduct a transaction.  
This is why diversity and flexibility of the payment process is highly desirable for the 
success of the Personal Router.  
1.1.3 Privacy 
Privacy is a major component of the choice of a system or another. In effect, the Personal 
Router sits exactly at the intersection between several major technologies. First, it is a 
mobile communication device. Second, it needs to conduct electronic transaction very 
often. Finally, it provides access to the Internet and to all the services available on the 
Internet.  
 
Getting wireless and mobile service everywhere will possibly leave an easily traceable 
trail. While the user is walking down the street or driving his car, the Personal Router is 
continuously scanning for available services and negotiating, depending on requests from 
the personal devices of the user. The providers with which the device is interacting are 
  Chapter 1 
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not known and cannot be trusted. This constant activity could leave a trail that could be 
traced back to the actual user if this issue is not addressed.  
On the e-commerce side, negotiations lead to transactions and to the providing of 
services. Making a transaction can leak information, and this must be controlled.  
The service provided can also lead to information leakage. The traffic (voice and/or data) 
is transiting through an unknown and untrusted provider. This provider could use the 
easily accessible data going through its network to get personal information about its 
customers. Providers in the world of the Personal Router are likely to be much more 
numerous, making it much more difficult to enforce regulations. On the other hand, the 
large number of providers greatly increases the difficulty for them to collude and to build 
an accurate profile of users. 
 
The fact that the Personal Router intersects with those three issues of privacy makes the 
global problem even more difficult. A party accessing personal information of the user 
could obtain this information if released to other parties. For instance, if the user is going 
to pay with her credit card and leave her name, it may be useless to make the mobile and 
the Internet aspects anonymous if parties collude and correlate the different pieces of 
information. 
Moreover, privacy is a complex problem in itself, because it has many different levels. 
People have many different privacy expectations, depending on context, culture, habit, or 
other variables quantified with difficulty. Users could also use their private information 
as a component of the transaction: for instance, they may choose to give their name or 
some other personal details in order to get a cheaper service in some specific 
circumstances.  
 
To address this issue, chapter 3 gives some privacy prospective by defining privacy and 
examining privacy in the US and European law. It then describes the specific privacy 
issues in mobile communications, electronic commerce and Internet and gives a few 
examples of solutions that have been tried.  
Introduction   
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1.2 Approach to payment systems 
1.2.1 Definition of the problem 
The Personal Router model implies that a very large number of providers will interact 
with a very large number of users. This model will be difficult to put into service if only a 
fixed number of predefined payment systems are available.  
To be able to compare and select any payment system, a comprehensive framework is 
needed. This framework must allow parties to select and negotiate payment systems to 
conduct a particular transaction. This will be done according to predefined constraints 
and preferences from both sides.  
The framework should be able to automatically compare payment systems. It needs to be 
able to negotiate about the properties of the system, and possibly be able to slightly 
modify it to be closer to the ideal characteristics. It should also define fairly high-level 
variables that users could set up and that would represent important properties of payment 
system. 
1.2.2 Related work 
Most approaches to payment systems compare payment properties as a whole. This has a 
number of drawbacks. First, it requires a complete examination of a payment scheme to 
extract its properties. Payment schemes are very complex and are not easy to analyze. 
This is therefore a high level task, not easy to perform automatically. Secondly, there are 
many ways of building a payment scheme; therefore, two payment schemes will not be 
easy to compare. Finally, changing one property of a payment system is likely to require 
rebuilding a whole new system.  
Other articles, like (Jackobson, Mraihi, Tsiounis and Yung, 1999), (Pfitzmann and 
Waidner, 1996), (Asokan, Janson, Steiner, and Weidner, 1996), or (Lee, Yu and Kuo, 
2001), give different ways to analyze payment systems. They give precise definitions of 
the properties of payment systems. Depending on their standpoint, they chose different 
properties. These properties are important and constitute an accurate framework for 
describing payment system. This helps to build taxonomy of payment system, but is not 
close enough to implementation to allow automated comparisons and selections of 
  Chapter 1 
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payment schemes. None of these articles suggested a way to formalize comparisons and 
selections of payment systems depending on user preferences and context. While it is 
important to be able to define and classify payment system, the context of the Personal 
Router require a way to select a specific payment system according to a changing context 
and the unpredictable result of a negotiation.  
From this standpoint, the approach demonstrated in (MacKie-Mason and White, 1997) is 
more interesting. The method is to choose thirty criteria. Each payment system is 
characterized along these criteria, and compared by a decision maker algorithm. This 
thesis builds on this approach and tries to simplify the way payment systems are 
described and built. The attributes chosen are important to give a good description of 
payment systems. The selection process presented in this thesis is an adaptation of the 
decision maker algorithm suggested in this article. The decision maker proposed in 
(MacKie-Mason and White, 1997) uses a form of prioritization characteristics. The idea 
is that a small number of high priority characteristics are often sufficient to make a 
decision, without the need to include smaller priorities. This simplifies the algorithm, but 
does not provide a way to slightly modify the chosen scheme to go closer to users’  
preferences.  
Another interesting approach is the one chosen by P3P1, developed by the World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C). P3P lets a client and a server negotiate on what information will 
be recorded and how it will be used. However, P3P is designed for the web, and not 
really suited for electronic payment. The other issue is that P3P relies on trust: there is no 
enforcement.  
1.2.3 The approach chosen  
Instead of studying payment systems as a whole, this thesis approaches payment systems 
by decomposing them into primitive operations. A primitive operation is defined as an 
operation that performs a basic function during the payment procedure. The range of 
payment systems is wide, but this thesis proposes to extract six primitive operations: 
authentication, authorization, transfer, record keeping, aggregation, and timing. The 
                                                 
1
 http://www.w3.org/P3P/  
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combination of these primitives creates an entity that replicates the original payment 
system. The comparisons are made through a set of attributes. 
Attributes represent a sub-part of the properties of payment systems presented in chapter 
2. They are the main characteristics that are important for selecting a payment system in 
particular situations. They are not design properties, which are important to accurately 
describe a payment system, but which are not useful when comparing payment systems in 
a specific environment and context. The attributes selected are divided in two groups. The 
first group is a group of physical requirements due to the environment, such as the type of 
user device necessary, the time available, or the communication bandwidth. The second 
group is a group of preferences set by users, which could change depending on context, 
such as privacy, security, or obtrusiveness.  
Primitives are elementary operation representing a portion of a payment. A payment can 
be decomposed into these primitive operations, and can be modeled as a construction of 
these primitives.  
 
Primitive are only a small part of a much bigger problem. To achieve a complete 
framework, several additional pieces would be needed. First, a good decision maker 
algorithm would be necessary to pick the right payment systems among the choices 
available. Then an efficient user interface is mandatory to help users go through all the 
possibilities they have and to help them understand what decisions are taken on their 
behalf. Finally, an effective negotiation protocol must be implemented in order to find the 
most suitable payment system for all the parties involved.  
 
This model of payment systems has several advantages over the traditional approach. 
First of all, instead of defining a taxonomy of complete payment systems, we can define a 
taxonomy of these primitives. Although it is true that each primitive will be implemented 
in a different way depending on the payment system, it is possible to observe classes of 
primitives acting almost identically and having the same types of properties. Then, by 
compiling the properties of each primitive involved, we can derive the properties of the 
payment system. Therefore, a comparison of two payment schemes is done very easily by 
comparing their primitive elements.  
  Chapter 1 
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Secondly, once a payment system is decomposed into these primitive elements, it 
becomes very easy to modify its properties by interchanging one primitive. For this 
purpose, primitives are further broken down into general classes. Each of these classes 
describes a way to implement the primitive, and can be implemented for real. These 
classes perform a similar operation; it is therefore possible to exchange an 
implementation for another. As a result, the resulting payment system has modified 
properties.  
Finally, the combination of these two advantages creates a favorable framework for 
negotiation. Starting from pre-defined payment systems, it is very easy to change their 
properties by changing their primitives. These modifications can takes place as the result 
of requirements from one or more parties involved, and can evolve depending on 
negotiation of the properties of the payment.  
 
A potential application of this capability is the automated negotiation of payment 
systems. The device will be able to negotiate not only for services, but also for the 
payment system to be used and for the information exchanged. These three negotiations 
will be conducted together; for instance, the provider may charge less is the payment is 
made with electronic cash, compared to a payment through the credit card system. Instead 
of only negotiating for the type of payment to be made, it may be possible to modify a 
payment scheme so that it would fulfill the requirements of both the user and the 
provider. In this case, the negotiation would also include the construction of this 
corresponding scheme.  
1.2.4 Results 
Chapter 5 gives three examples of the application of the framework of primitives. Three 
payment systems are chosen: DigiCash, the credit card system, and PayPal. These three 
systems, chosen for their properties and their popularity, are decomposed into primitives. 
The attributes are characterized for each of these primitives. Some modifications of these 
primitives, creating alteration of the complete payment system, are examined.  
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The primitive are demonstrated to work for at least those three payment systems. They 
even provide a relatively easy way to slightly modify them. However, the proposed 
framework does not seem to be powerful enough to be able to produce deep changes in 
payment schemes. This is due to the fact that in the present framework, the shape and the 
interfaces of the payment system have to be preserved.  
In the conclusion, after a brief overview of key findings, several open issues are pointed 
out. Among them, privacy issues, the design of a powerful user interface and negotiation 
algorithm, and potential enhancements of the framework that would allow deeper 
modifications of payment systems are the most important.  
 - 23 - 
2 THE RICHNESS OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
The aim of this chapter is to understand better the complexity of the problems raised by 
the Personal Router in the fields of payment systems. The Personal Router needs different 
systems for different usages. The notion of payment system is complex and requires the 
understanding of the multiple characteristics of payment systems. Therefore, this chapter 
gives an understanding of and the numerous properties and the diversity of payment 
systems that the Personal Router should be able to support.  
After a few definitions relevant to payment schemes, various characteristics of payment 
systems are presented.  
To get a deeper overview of payment systems, see (O’ Mahony, Peirce, and Tewari, 2001) 
and (Camp, 2000). 
2.1 Definitions 
In this section, we define some of the terms we will use intensively thereafter. 
2.1.1 Transactions 
A transaction is a transfer of goods and money between two entities. It usually involves 
four steps, some of which may be optional: 
  Chapter 2 
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1. 
 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
 
4. 
BUYER 
BUYER 
BUYER 
BUYER 
SELLER 
SELLER 
SELLER 
SELLER 
ID 
 
Receipt 
Termination 
 
Figure 2-1: Definition of a transaction in four steps 
1. Authentication: Each party identifies itself and shows proof of identification to 
make sure that they are authorized to conduct this transaction, and that they really 
are the entity they claim to be. 
2. Trade: During this step, the payer gives money to the payer, and the payee gives 
the goods to the payer. This step may involve third parties certifying the validity 
of the exchange. 
3. Acknowledgement: Each party sends a receipt that acknowledges the reception of 
the payment and of the goods. 
4. Conclusion: If all parties agree on the outcome of the exchange, the transaction 
terminates. In the case of disagreements, dispute resolution mechanisms must be 
applied. 
 Examples 
Retrieving a web page can be viewed as a very simple transaction, which involves neither 
exchange of money nor receipt. First, the browser connects to the distant server (and if 
necessary shows credentials in case of restricted pages). Then the server sends back the 
requested files. Finally, the connection ends. 
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A more complex transaction is, for instance, buying beer. In effect, buying beer can be 
described as a four steps transaction: 
1. First, the buyer shows proof (e.g. ID) that he is over 21, thus being authorized to 
buy alcohol, 
2. Then the buyer pays for the beer and the barman serves it. The buyer can check 
that the drink served is a beer, and the barman can check that the bill is not false. 
3. The barman gives a receipt to the buyer, showing that the beer was paid. 
4. All parties agree on the happy conclusion of the deal, and the buyer can drink the 
beer.  
2.1.2 Stakeholders 
 Merchant and the merchant’s bank 
The merchant is the entity that sells goods, either physically or electronically, in 
exchange for money. A fraudulent merchant would try to get the money without 
delivering the goods. The merchant is sometimes called the seller or the payee. 
The merchant has an account in a bank, which can also be called the acquirer. This bank 
is capable of converting electronic money into external forms of money. 
 Buyer and the buyer’s bank 
The buyer is the entity that buys goods from the merchant by using money. The buyer is 
sometimes called the payer, the customer or the client. A fraudulent buyer would try to 
get goods with paying for them. 
The buyer has an account in a bank, sometimes also called the issuer, the broker or the 
billing center. The bank has the ability to convert external forms of money such as cash 
or checks into electronic money. 
 Broker 
Some systems use a broker as a central authority for delivering electronic money to 
buyers and collecting it from merchants. In some cases, a single broker can play the roles 
of both the issuer and the acquirer. 
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The broker plays two important roles. The first one is to allow parties that are unknown to 
each other to complete a transaction. There is a transfer of risk from the payee to the 
broker. The second role is the role of an aggregator. A broker has a large number of 
relationships with players in the market, and can therefore benefit from strong economies 
of scale during the different steps of a transaction. 
 Trusted third-party 
A trusted third-party is an entity trusted by both the buyer and the seller. It can assume 
many different roles depending on the system. It can either be a broker, a certification 
authority, a central authority, a clearing center (mediating transfers of money and goods), 
an arbiter, or an anonymizing / pseudonymizing server. It can also play different roles for 
law enforcement and tax purposes, or dispute resolution. 
 Observers 
Observers are entities monitoring the transmissions between the customer and the 
merchant. Observers cannot read encrypted information, but can read all other 
information transmitted while making the transaction. 
 Governments 
In the case of law enforcement with warrant, governments can obtain records from banks 
and merchant. However, the amount of information that can be obtained depends on the 
electronic payment system. The aim of governments is to prevent fraudulent actions such 
as tax evasion and money laundering. 
2.2 Characteristics of payment schemes 
In this section, we define the main properties of payment systems. These characteristics 
are the basic variables that can be used to describe a payment system in depth. They help 
to classify payment systems, and to define the requirements of a payment system to be 
used in a particular context. The following characteristics come from a number of 
articles, in particular (Mackie-Mason and White, 1996), (Ferreira and Dahab, 1998), 
(Pfitzmann and Waidner, 1996), (Asokan, et Al., 1996), and (Lee, et Al., 2001). This is 
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not a compilation of design characteristics of payment models; the following section aims 
at exploring the spectrum of payment systems and pointing out the most important 
properties.  
2.2.1 Exchange model 
The model of exchange describes the way value is changing hands during a transaction. 
Historically, there have been three main models for exchanging value: barter, tokens and 
notational money. 
 Barter vs. money 
Barter is the oldest way of exchanging value. It has since been replaced by money, which 
is a much more efficient way to exchange value. Barter requires that the two parties agree 
on two assets they would be willing to exchange. This way of exchanging value is not 
efficient, because this system needs to create correspondences between all exchangeable 
goods.  
On the contrary, money requires only a correspondence between all exchangeable goods 
and money. Barter is replaced by a two-step process: first, sell the first good to convert it 
to money, and then buy the second good. 
Money can also play two other important roles in the economy. The first one is to provide 
a standard of value, which facilitates the evaluation and the comparison of goods and 
services. The second one is a store of value. Wealth is much more difficult to store, 
exchange and transport in the form of cattle or fields than in the form of money.  
 Token based 
In a token-based system, transactions are made by exchanging tokens of predefined 
values, bought from a central authority before the transaction, like coins and banknotes. 
The stream of bits is itself valuable. These systems are also called cash-like, or token 
money. A large sub-category of this model is pre-paid systems, in which the buyer buys 
token from the merchant before the transaction, and uses them to get the goods. One 
example is pre-paid phone cards. 
 
  Chapter 2 
 - 28 - 
The big issue raised by token-based schemes is double-spending. Double-spending occurs 
when users are able to spend twice or more the same token. In the case of electronic 
money, duplicating tokens can be fairly easy if additional protections are not created, as a 
token is nothing more than a stream of bits.  
This can happen either in the case of fraudulent action of either the buyer, the seller or 
observers. The buyer could spend several times the same electronic token; a seller may 
try to redeem the same token several times; an observer wiretapping communications 
could copy the token and spend it instead of the buyer. 
 Notational 
Notational systems exchange documents that enable money transfer between two 
accounts managed by a central authority. The central authority is responsible for keeping 
records of the transactions and of the accounts. The best example is bank checks or 
credit/debit cards. In notational systems, the information transmitted is not valuable by 
itself; it is valuable because of the transfers of money between accounts resulting from 
this information. 
Value is actually transferred by debiting the payer’ s account and crediting the payee’ s 
account. 
 Relations between token and notational money 
Token and notational money are just two extreme positions of payment systems. There 
exist different payment systems that can share properties of both systems at the same 
time. An example of these is cashier checks. Cashier checks presents several similarities 
with a token money, although there are closer to being considered as notational.  
There are also many interfaces between notational and token money, such as ATM. 
2.2.2 Hardware 
 Specific 
Some systems require a specific hardware to process transactions. For example, credit 
cards, smart cards, are a specific hardware, and they need a card reader to complete the 
transaction. Hardware specific schemes usually assume that some part of the hardware is 
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tamper-proof (for instance, the chip of a smart card is supposed to be inaccessible and 
tamper-resistant, even by the card holder). In this case, the hardware can certify that the 
user is not over-spending money. It can also help to block fraudulent actions. The best 
example of this is Chaum’ s device (Chaum, 1992). 
 Non-specific / software only 
Non-specific hardware can be any general-purpose hardware like a computer, a PDA, a 
cell-phone, etc. In this case, the transaction scheme is software only. The system must 
have additional security features to prevent users from obtaining any benefit from 
tampering with the software, the data or the communications exchanged. 
2.2.3 Authorization 
 Out-band authorization 
The central authority sends a message to the payer and asks her to approve or deny the 
transaction off-line using another communication channel. For instance, this channel can 
be post mail or a phone call. An example of this on the Internet is First Virtual, which 
sends a demand of approval to the payer via email. 
 Authorization by shared secret 
The central authority requires that the transaction include a shared secret known only to 
the payer and the central authority. This secret can be a password or a PIN, or any 
cryptographic variation of a shared secret. 
 Authorization by Signature 
The central authority can require that every transaction include a signature from the 
payer. This signature can be either electronic with the use cryptographic tools, or 
handwritten in the case of checks. 
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2.2.4 Utilization model 
 Account / registration 
Most of the electronic payment schemes require that users register first and use an 
account. This account may be set either with the vendor or with a broker or a bank. This 
may limit the base for vendors and/or customers using this payment scheme, therefore 
limiting universality. 
 Storable electronic money 
Some systems allow customers to store their electronic money on their personal device. It 
means that transaction between the bank and the users can be asynchronous. Users have 
to contact the bank only occasionally. This is often used by micropayment schemes, as it 
limits communication costs. 
2.2.5 Central Authority 
 Off-line 
Off-line systems allow users to make transactions without contacting the system’ s central 
authority at the moment of the transaction. Only the payer and the payee have to be in 
contact at the moment of the transaction. 
This kind of payment must include a way of verifying the validity of the transaction.  
Examples of off-line systems are cash (the seller can verify that the banknote is a real 
one), checks (the seller can verify the ID of the customer and her handwritten signature).  
The main issue with off-line systems is that they need a way to ensure that users are not 
spending more money than they actually possess. These systems, like credit cards, 
usually implement limits on how much the user can overspend. 
 On-line 
On-line systems require one of more of the parties to be on-line at the moment of the 
transaction and contact the central authority. The central authority can then authorize the 
transaction. This implies relatively high communication costs, and assumes that the 
central authority can always be contacted. If the network goes down, no transaction can 
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be accepted. In the case of network congestions, an on-line transaction may be subject to 
time delays. 
Examples of on-line systems are debit-card systems, and Internet based schemes. 
2.2.6 Transaction costs 
Transaction costs are the represent the marginal cost of a transaction. Processing a 
transaction creates some costs. For instance, it could be the cost of connecting to a central 
server, the cost of computing a cryptographic signature, a processing fee charged by a 
bank, or any other incremental cost.  
 High transaction costs 
Transaction costs are typically high when the transaction involves manual processing. 
This causes huge overheads and long delays. An example of a scheme having high 
transaction costs is the check system. 
 Medium transaction costs 
Payment system will incur an intermediate level of transaction costs if they do not use 
manual processing, but do use strong cryptography for online authentication and 
clearance. Therefore, they need high computational capabilities and most of them require 
large communication expenses. They often have high setup costs. 
 Low transaction costs 
The cost of a transaction can be reduced further by eliminating the strong cryptographic 
features and reducing the overheads due to communications and computations. The 
transaction costs can be reduced to a few cents, and sometimes to fractions of a penny. 
 Financial risks 
The risks of a financial loss can be borne by one or several parties. These risks may 
increase the costs of a transaction. The risks borne by the customer can be limited by 
limitations of the maximum amount that can be transferred. Some other systems, like 
credit cards, use a maximum customer liability in the case of fraudulent transactions ($50 
in the case of credit cards). 
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The risk can be borne by the merchant or by the central authority, depending on the 
design of the scheme. 
2.2.7 Payment Values 
Each payment system is usually designed for a specific range of payment only, and may 
not be really well suited for other ranges. This is mainly due to a trade-off between the 
different characteristics of the scheme, in particular transaction costs and the level of 
security offered by the scheme. For instance, a scheme implying high transaction costs 
will be uneconomical for small financial transactions, and a scheme offering only poor 
security capability will be too risky for big transactions. 
 Large payments 
Large payments require a more regulated framework to record the payment amounts and 
sometimes the parties. This is required for governmental inquiries and for dispute 
resolutions. Moreover, consumers need to have transaction records and dispute resolution 
mechanisms. They also need adequate security capabilities for transmission of funds. 
However, transaction overheads like processing costs, time or communication costs are of 
less importance because these costs tend to be really small in regard to the transaction 
itself, and large transactions are relatively infrequent. Also, anonymity is not always 
required, as a trail is usually required by law and makes dispute resolution easier. 
Large payments are usually payment of more than a few hundreds of dollars. These 
systems often require dedicated networks (for instance inter-bank networks) offering 
greater security than Internet can provide today. 
 Micropayments 
Micropayments are payment of a small value, typically less than $5. Some of the 
micropayment schemes are able to conduct transaction of tenths or even hundredths of a 
cent. The general property of these payments is to have a very low marginal cost, so that 
they can stay profitable even for small amounts. 
In this case, dispute resolution is less important, because the amounts of transaction are 
very low. The exception to that statement is when micropayments are aggregated. 
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Therefore, most micropayment schemes provide fraud detection only when it is done on a 
large scale. Nevertheless, these systems must be simple to use, efficient, quick, should 
have a very low computation and communication overhead.  
They should also be as anonymous as possible, so that users cannot be easily traced. 
However, anonymous systems require higher computational costs, and are therefore not 
easy to implement. 
 Small to medium payments 
Small to medium payment fill the gap between large payments and micropayments 
schemes. They can have all varieties of properties of micropayments and large payments. 
2.2.8 Elemental payment properties 
 ACID properties 
ACID means Atomic, Consistent, Isolated, and Durable.  
 Atomic 
An atomic transaction cannot be split into sub-parts. An atomic transaction either 
succeeds or fails completely. It conserves money: no money can be created (for instance, 
both accounts are credited) nor lost (both accounts are debited). For example, either the 
money is in the payer’ s wallet, or it is on the merchant’  account. The goods are either 
delivered to the customer and the sender has a proof of the delivery, or they are not. 
There are two different kinds of atomicity: money-transfer atomicity and goods-transfer 
atomicity. A transfer of good is atomic if the money and the goods are linked and 
transferred atomically.  
 Consistent 
A transaction is consistent if all parties agree on the facts of the transaction. For instance, 
if a customer pays $10 to a merchant, the payer, the merchant and the banks all have to 
agree that $10 was transferred from the customer’ s account to the merchant’ s account. 
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 Isolated 
A transaction is said to be isolated if there are no overlap or interference with other 
transactions. Transactions executed at the same time should be separable. A customer 
should not be charged for someone else’ s transaction. If a customer makes two 
transactions at the same time, she should not be charged the sum of both transactions for 
the first transaction and nothing for the second. 
 Durable 
A transaction is durable if it can be restored to its previous consistent state at any time. 
 Non-repudiation 
ACID properties provide non-repudiation of the transaction. A transaction whose sub-
steps are non-repudiable is non-repudiable itself.  
 Reliability 
A system is reliable if it is able to recover from failures, attacks, memory losses, etc, to a 
previous consistent state.  
 Divisibility 
Divisibility is a property that allows users to exchange arbitrary fractions of a previous 
transaction. All account-based systems have this property, as any fraction of the balance 
can be withdrawn. Cash, and more generally token-based systems, are not divisible: it is 
not possible to give half a one-dollar bill as a payment for 50 cents! 
Some schemes go around this issue by issuing tokens whose values are the successive 
powers of two. E-cash, for instance, issues tokens worth 1 penny, 2 cents, 4 cents, 8 
cents, etc, so that any amount of money can be transferred. 
 Transferability – Role inversibility 
Transferability is a property that allows people to transfer funds between each other 
without contacting the bank or a central authority. This property is obvious for cash; 
however, it is very difficult to implement electronically because of security issues.  
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Role inversibility means that the payer and the payee can play each other’ s role. In the 
case of cash or checks, roles are interchangeable. Each user can play different roles. In 
the case of credit cards, roles are not interchangeable; each user has a predefined role 
(buyer or seller). This property is also called “ two-way”  or “ peer-to-peer”  transaction.  
2.2.9 System security 
 Data transmission 
 Isolating the transmission infrastructure 
One secure but expensive way of achieving transmission security is to use a dedicated 
channel of communication. This solution is used by banks to process funds transfer 
within and between banks, and by smart cards schemes, which use a secure channel, the 
card reader, to communicate with the chip of the smart card. 
 Using Encryption 
Another way of achieving security is to use encryption of the communication link over 
insecure channels. This allows conducting financial transaction over the Internet or the 
public communication networks. Most of the systems use public-key encryption. The 
encryption key is publicly available, while the decryption key is kept secret. The sender 
needs only to know the receiver’ s public key to send encrypted messages. 
 Authentication 
Electronic payment systems may require that the payer and/or the payee be authenticated 
at one point during the transaction. For instance, the bank needs to identify the payer 
before delivering money, and the seller needs to be authenticated to verify that the 
payment is made to the real payee; this is particularly important to prevent the “ man-in-
the-middle”  attack. Payment systems display a wide range of authentication methods, 
including signatures, passwords, and biometrics. 
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 Handwritten signature 
Handwritten signatures are the oldest authentication scheme. They are used to secure 
check and credit card transactions. However, This scheme is very expensive, as it 
requires an expert to tell whether the signature was forged. In effect, signatures vary and 
cannot be easily recognized by electronic devices. Furthermore, they do not really protect 
from the misuse of stolen checks or cards. 
 PIN / Passwords 
The most common way of authenticating is by a Personal Identification Number. This 
system is used to authenticate simple systems like a magnetic card in an ATM. Passwords 
are just an evolution of this scheme. The number of possible combinations is much higher 
than with a PIN-based scheme. 
However, PINs and passwords suffer from the same defaults. People have difficulties 
remembering their password, they tend to write them down, or use very simple passwords 
such as their birthday date. 
 Electronic signatures 
Electronic signatures use cryptographic technologies to certify that a document was 
created by a particular person. The document, or the hash value of the document, is 
encrypted with the private key of the user. Anybody can verify that the document was 
created by this person and was not modified by decrypting this value with the public key 
and checking that the hash value is the same as the one obtained by hashing the 
document. 
The weakness of this scheme is that the secret key has to be stored in an electronic form. 
It can either be stored on a personal computer, but in this case anyone that can access this 
computer can sign a document on the behalf of the real user, or it can be stored on a smart 
card, but in this case we need a way (PIN or password) to gain access to the smart card. 
A public key can be checked by having it signed by a central authority recognized by 
everybody. 
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 Biometrics 
Biometrics uses measurable biological characteristics such as fingerprints, voiceprints, 
eyeprints, face recognition, etc, to authenticate the user. These systems are not widely 
used yet, but they should develop in the near future as techniques improve. 
2.2.10 Costs 
Costs can be differentiated between four categories: 
• Computation 
• Communication 
• Fraud 
• General and administrative costs 
Although it can be fairly easy to normalize computation and communication costs (e.g. 
number of elementary operations to perform, bandwidth), it seems much more difficult to 
normalize fraud costs and administrative costs. 
 Computational costs 
 Different types of computational costs 
Computational costs are the costs incurred by computation required by the payment 
scheme. There are three main types of arithmetic operations required: authentication, 
encryption and hash functions. 
 Authentication  
The most used way of identifying someone is to use a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
This requires the generation of public/private keys pairs, and large computations to 
compute and to verify signatures. Moreover, verifying a signature is often not enough, 
especially if the public key of the user has not been previously verified. In this case, the 
signature has to be signed by a certificate authority, whose signature has also to be 
verified. This creates a chain of signature verification along the certification authority 
(CA) hierarchy, which goes up to the certification root. 
Some systems (usually micropayment schemes like PayWord, MicroMint or PayTree) 
use a much less computation-intensive way to verify the identity of a user. Instead of 
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computing public key signatures, they compute the hash function of a number given by 
the payer. If the result of the hash function gives a pre-determined value, then the user is 
authenticated. 
 Encryption 
Encryption is very important to keep the data between the parties secret and to avoid 
eavesdropping. This can be a part of the security features of the system, to prevent 
eavesdroppers to learn secret codes or coins, and/or this can be a feature designed to keep 
the transaction private. Two kinds of encryption exist: the symmetric encryption and the 
asymmetric encryption. In the symmetric encryption, both users use the same 
cryptographic key. In the asymmetric encryption, each user has a private/public key pair. 
Asymmetric encryption is much more computation-intensive. 
Schemes like SSL allow to establish contact via asymmetric encryption, and then to 
exchange a session symmetric key, which will be used to encrypt communications. 
 Hash function 
Hash functions are used a lot by micropayment schemes. A hash function is a function 
that produces a number from a message in such a way that it is extremely unlikely that 
some other text will produce the same hash value. It means that finding another message 
whose result is the same by the hash function is extremely difficult. Commonly used hash 
algorithms are SHA, MD5, MD6, etc.  
They are used to digest messages and to ensure integrity, and sometimes as authentication 
system (see authentication). 
 Type of user’s device 
Depending on the type of device making the computations, computational cost can be 
more or less important. If the computations are done on the user’s PC, this should not be a 
problem, since most machines are capable of computing several hundreds of 1024 bits 
RSA signatures per second. However, if the payment system is to be used on a mobile 
device with limited computational power, or on a smart card with only a few kilobytes of 
ROM and RAM memory and a slow 8-bits processor, this may be a huge problem. 
Special algorithms have to be designed in this case. 
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 On the server’s side 
On the server’s side, the scaling of equipment with the number of user has to be 
reasonable. In particular, the bottlenecks can be the communication link, the number of 
digital signature to sign or verify per transaction and the number of computation in 
general. This is particularly the case in micropayment schemes, where the equipment has 
to be leveraged on a very large number of transactions to become profitable. 
Some payment systems, like MicroMint, take advantage of the large number of coins to 
be prepared; in fact, the marginal cost of minting a new coin is decreasing exponentially. 
Other systems do not scale so nicely. 
 Communication costs 
These costs are especially high in the case of mobile commerce. If the transaction must 
occur over a mobile link of usual current mobile networks such as GSM, communications 
are slow and expensive. Therefore, payment systems designed for this type of application 
must implement special features to limit the amount of data to be transfer as well as the 
time of connection. As an example, SET developed a specific mobile-oriented payment 
system called mobile-SET, which is an evolution of the SET protocol specifically 
designed for mobile handsets. 
 Administrative costs 
Administrative and general costs are the costs of maintaining the system, keeping records 
of different operations, registering users, searching for fraudulent transactions, charging 
users, etc. 
For instance, DigiCash has to keep records of all coins spent to prevent double spending. 
Other systems have high registration costs. Some systems have to send bills to customers, 
which is very expensive. 
 Fraud costs 
Fraud costs occurs everywhere. Each of the previous costs is a trade-off with fraud. 
Reducing administrative, computation or communication costs will often increase fraud 
costs.  
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 Fraud: two opposite approaches 
Some systems try to prevent fraud by design. Fraud is made impossible by the use of 
private credential, or by other means. For instance, to forge a check, we would have to 
imitate someone else’s signature, which is supposedly impossible. In the electronic world, 
we would have to show that we know the private key of someone else. PayPal and 
Yahoo! PayDirect use a link to the real world to ensure the identity of their customers and 
their real-world bank account. When a new user is registering, the system makes two 
small deposits of a random amount between 1 cent and 99 cents, and if the user can tell 
the amounts transferred, then she has access to the real-world account and she is 
authenticated as the real owner of the account. 
 
On the other hand, others schemes acknowledge that small-scale fraud is possible, and try 
to prevent only large-scale fraud. This is often the case in micropayment schemes. The 
main approach in this case is to make sure that forging a coin is much more expensive 
than the expected value of the coin. Therefore, there will be no economical incentive to 
cheat, although it is technically possible. 
 Detecting fraud before or after the transaction 
Another design characteristic is to know whether the system tries to detect fraud before or 
after it was performed. It is obviously much more expensive to detect it during the 
transaction, because it involves much more real-time communications and computations. 
If the system is designed to detect fraud after the transaction, it can be done off-line 
during the idle time of the server. 
Micropayment often choose the second solution. If a fraudulent action by the user is 
detected, this user can be blacklisted and rejected from the payment system. 
 Who is supporting the fraud costs? 
In case of fraud, at least one of the actors of the transaction has to lose some money. 
Depending on the system, fraud costs are in fact supported by the financial institution, the 
payee, the payer, or a combination of those three actors. 
The Richness of Payment Systems 
 - 41 - 
Note that in the special case of credit cards, the customer is usually only liable for a small 
part of a fraudulent transaction. The customer usually has to pay the first $50 in the US. 
The credit card network must pay the rest.  
This cost takes a very important part in the financial equilibrium of the payment system. 
2.2.11 Active / passive payment 
A basic definition of an active payment is a payment in which the user has an active role. 
A passive payment is a payment that does not need any input from the user. As we will 
see, the spectrum is more or less continuous between these two extreme positions. 
 Active payments 
In most design of current payment systems, users have been supposed active. For 
example, paying with current payment systems as cash or credit card requires a very 
active part from the user.  
This is sometimes desirable. For example, when a customer buys an airline tickets on the 
Internet for $400, she would like to be involve in the payment process at some point to 
make sure everything is in order. This is usually done by having to enter the credit card 
number on the checkout page. 
Similarly, most designs of electronic payment systems have at least a popup window to 
ask the user if she agrees on the payment to be made. Although the user’s perception of 
the payment in this method is less active than the previous one (one must only push the 
"OK" button), this is still active in the sense that the user is involved in the payment 
process.  
 The gray zone between active and passive 
However, this "active" process may become annoying, especially if this happens too 
often and if the amounts paid are too small. That is why we need methods where the 
user’s perception of the payment is more passive.  
Here are different typical models of use. There are obviously a lot of systems sitting 
between these three models.  
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 Active set-up, active action, passive transaction 
In this case, the user prefers to set up the payment system in advance for all subsequent 
payments, and let everything work on its own. 
A good example of this type of utilization is EZ-Pass. The user registers once for all with 
EZ-Pass, and can then avoid paying directly traffic tolls. By taking an active step, all 
future payments are passive: the user is not involved in the payment process at the time of 
the transaction. This is also the model of a cell phone registration.  
Still, this is still active in the sense that the payment is activated by an action of the user. 
The user knows that when passing a toll zone, she will be charged for it. 
This is also the business model of micropayments. A user sets up a payment system, 
either with a monthly bill or with a pre-paid system. When reading a newspaper on the 
Internet, users know that they will pay a certain amount per article viewed. However, no 
popup message is there to tell them. 
 Active set-up, passive action, passive transaction 
In this case, the user sets up the payment system before using it. However, she does not 
initiate directly the transaction. This could be a case of use of the Personal Router: the 
user is walking down the street, and walk into a "hot spot" without have any knowledge 
of it. The Personal Router decides autonomously to check the user’s email, and to conduct 
the transaction on its own. The user has no idea this is happening.  
However, this is not a full-passive mode, because the user set up the payment system and 
configured the device before the transaction, so that it would act like this in a hot spot. 
Although the user is really not involved in any part of the transaction, this transaction is 
still a result of her will. 
 Passive payment 
In a full passive mode, the device would decide everything, from the payment system to 
the decision of negotiating and using services. Therefore, it does not seem realistic to 
imagine that a device could decide to pay for something on its own. The payment process 
is always the result of the will of the user, expressed in a way or another during the set up 
phase. 
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2.2.12 Visible / invisible payment 
The user perception of the payment is not the same if the good bought is perceptible or 
not. This characteristic is one of the difficulty coming with the Personal Router is that 
connectivity is invisible. Most payment systems are designed to deal with visible goods, 
real or electronic. But the Personal Router’s user would buy connectivity, which is hard to 
define and is totally seamless for the user. Connectivity is characterized by delay and 
bandwidth. These two variables are much too low level for the user. The user just wants 
to check emails or download a file. Therefore, the user perception of this payment is 
fundamentally different from other payment paradigms. Thus, it makes sense to have 
some sort of passive mode, as it is much easier for a computer to understand the 
definition and the quality of the connectivity provided than it would be for a human 
being.  
2.2.13 Privacy 
Privacy issues will be examined in depth in section 3. This section analyzes only the 
privacy properties directly related to payment systems. The analysis method with privacy 
tables presented at the end of this section ill be used extensively in the chapter 4. 
 Anonymity and untraceability 
Privacy requires both anonymity and untraceability.  
Anonymity means that the user’ s identity cannot be uncovered during the transaction. 
This requires that information that could link to the user’ s real identity, like account ID or 
credit card number, be not used.  
Untraceability means that the transaction cannot be linked to other transactions involving 
the same user. Traceability means that all transactions of a user can be identified. 
Traceability facilitates profiling and marketing, and worries privacy advocates, while 
untraceability is an issue for legal authorities, as it is easier to use such systems for tax 
evasion and criminal activities.  
There are several degrees of traceability and anonymity. A transaction can be traceable, 
which means that a record is generated for each transaction, identifying data such as 
buyer, seller, amount, date, etc, as it is done in every credit card transaction. On the other 
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hand, untraceable payments cannot be linked to each other, and does not generate 
records, as for instance cash transactions. The spectrum is large between those two 
extreme points. For instance, some systems offer pseudonymity, which provide 
anonymity (the user’ s real identity is never exposed) without untraceability. From this 
kind of system, it is possible to improve the untraceability by frequently changing of 
pseudonym.  
 Perfect privacy 
Privacy is defined in paragraph 3.1.1. Schemes providing perfect privacy allow users to 
conduct transactions without leaking any personal information. This privacy is only 
limited by the capacities of the cryptographic techniques used. If cryptographic tools 
protecting the data are weak or can be broken, then the private information is exposed.  
Schemes like e-cash can convince the merchant and the bank that the information 
provided is correct and worth the value of the transaction, without revealing any 
information that could lead to the user’ s identity. The cryptographic technique used for e-
cash is called “ blinding;”  the bank signs a coin, thus giving it value, without being able to 
see the serial number. As a result, the coin is valid (signed by the bank), but nobody can 
identify the buyer, not even the bank.  
Another example of perfect privacy is cash, if the merchant cannot recognize the face of 
the customer. 
 No or limited privacy 
Privacy can be provided by many other ways. For instance, pseudonymity can prevent 
third parties from knowing the real identity of a user. A third party, such as a broker or a 
central authority, can also conduct the transaction on behalf of the customer.  
Finally, some systems, for instance credit cards or checks, do not provide any privacy at 
all.  
However, in some cases, parties can learn only a small part of the information about the 
others. For example, in a credit card transaction, the seller can learn the buyer’ s name and 
credit card number, but not her address or phone number. An observer of a cash 
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transaction can see the time of the transaction and the faces of both the seller and the 
buyer, but cannot know their name and address. 
 Revocable privacy 
Privacy is needed in most transactions, but it can sometimes cause regulatory and/or legal 
issues. In particular, a system providing perfect privacy capabilities could potentially 
make money laundering, illegal sales, fraud, and other illegal actions easier. Some 
schemes are able to revoke anonymity under certain circumstances such as a court order. 
 Context 
Privacy audits of a scheme must be conducted from the point of view of each of the 
stakeholders involved in the transaction. For example, cash provides perfect privacy 
towards governments and banks, and limited privacy towards the merchant and observers. 
Encrypted credit card transactions (for instance by using SSL) provide limited privacy 
towards governments and observers, and no privacy towards banks and the merchant. 
 Information considered 
Privacy is provided for certain types of information only. A scheme can provide perfect 
privacy for information about the customer, and no privacy at all for the amount of the 
transaction, the date, and the item purchased. 
 
This information can be summarized in a table. For instance, Table 2-1 lists the privacy 
characteristics of real cash. 
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Table 2-1: Privacy characteristics of a real cash transaction 
WHAT THEY KNOW  
Identity of 
buyer 
Identity of 
seller 
Amount of 
transaction 
Time and place 
of transaction 
Nature of 
transaction 
Identifiable N/A Face 
recognition Buyer 
Traceable N/A Nothing 
Everything Everything Everything 
Identifiable Face 
recognition 
N/A 
Seller 
Traceable Nothing N/A 
Everything Everything Everything 
Issuer Nothing Nothing Nothing Nothing Nothing Bank 
Acquirer Nothing Nothing Nothing Nothing Nothing 
Central authority Nothing Nothing Nothing Nothing Nothing 
W
H
O
 
K
N
O
W
S 
Observer Face 
recognition 
Face 
recognition 
Nothing Everything Partial 
 
This table lists in columns the type of information released, and in rows the party getting 
access to the information. For instance, the buyer knows the identity of the seller if the 
seller’ s face is recognized. Banks do not learn anything about the transaction. Observers 
know the faces of the buyer and the seller, and the time and place of the transaction, but 
do not know the amount.  
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2.3 Transaction Models for the Personal Router 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This section tries to list as many models of transaction occurring in the context of the 
Personal Router as possible. Of course, this list cannot be exhaustive and it should not 
limit the design of the transaction system implemented in the Personal Router. The aim of 
this list of models is to get a more precise idea of the possible types of transactions that 
could occur between a Personal Router user and a service provider. This can be 
particularly useful in order to have a better understanding of the flows of money and 
information between the different parties during a transaction. These models are not at 
the same level as payments; in fact, the payment could occur as a part of a transaction, 
and many other data exchanges could occur in addition. Therefore, these models lead to a 
better appreciation of the potential data leakages that are not due to the payment. 
2.3.2 Business opportunities 
There are different business incentives for an established business to install a Personal 
Router base station. The first one is obviously to sell connectivity. Users passing by have 
the opportunity to get access to the Internet through this paying access point.  
Another incentive is to use the Personal Router as a device transferring value and money. 
If the payment capabilities of the Personal Router are well developed, this device will be 
capable not only of buying bandwidth and network access, but also of buying any good 
available.  
Finally, another important aspect of the Personal Router is the “ bribe.”  By providing 
access, it is possible to stimulate a business. It could even be for free (“ come buy a pizza 
in my pizza shop, you’ ll get 15 minutes of free access” ).  
These three models are particularly interesting for convenience stores. They could 
provide “ hot spots”  of high bandwidth Internet access, could easily take advantage of a 
new way of paying electronically, and could stimulate their business by having cars, for 
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instance, coming to their gas station because drivers can have high speed Internet access 
while refueling.  
2.3.3 Definitions 
Four possible entities may be involved: 
• The user is the owner of the Personal Router, trying to access wireless services 
through his Personal Router. 
• The provider is the operator of the Personal Router Base Station (PRBS). It can be 
either an individual or a company operating several PRBS. Another entity could 
also be included in these models: the upstream provider, which provides the 
upstream communication link to the provider. 
• A third party is a distinct party involved in the transaction. 
• The broker is a third party that may be needed, generally to participate in the 
exchange of money. 
 
Three different links are considered in these simple models: Authentication, Payment and 
Relationship.  
• A payment is a transfer of money between two entities 
• An authorization may be needed to ensure that a user has the right to access a 
service of other entities. Credentials may be a form of authorization. 
• A relationship is a particular association between two entities that goes beyond 
the communication itself (e.g. employee, hotel guest, etc) 
2.3.4 Direct transaction between the user and the provider  
In this scheme, the user is doing a transaction with the provider only. Figure 2-2 shows 
the three different possibilities.  
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USER PROVIDER payment 
USER PROVIDER 
Relationship 
Authorization 
USER PROVIDER Relationship 
1. 
2. 
3. 
 
Figure 2-2: Direct transaction between the user and the provider 
 Direct payment 
The first possibility is that the user pays directly to the provider. A third party may be 
involved, only if it is necessary to conduct the payment; it depends on the payment 
scheme. These payments may be done for example through micropayment schemes, or by 
a long-term relationship with the provider. 
 Simple relationship 
Another option is when the user can have a simple relationship with the provider. For 
instance, a user could get a free wireless services just for being inside a mall.  
 Special Relationship 
Finally, the user can use her company’ s wireless network, a personal Airport station at 
home or any other private network. Authentication may be used to control access to the 
network; however, no payment is required.  
2.3.5 Transactions through brokers 
 Possible roles of the broker 
The broker can play two different roles in a transaction. 
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 Relationships 
The first value of a broker is to bring in value added by relationships. Effectively, brokers 
are more likely to be already engaged in a relationship with different parties than a single 
player in the market. They are therefore more likely to successfully conduct transactions 
with parties that do not know each other. 
 Aggregator 
Another important role of a broker, coming from the fact that they have a large number of 
relationships with players in the market, is to aggregate payment from different users and 
directed to different providers.  
This results in a transfer of risk from the provider to the broker; in effect, the broker now 
takes on the risk that the user may not pay or may make fraudulent payments. 
Aggregation also allows the broker to benefit from strong economies of scale for billing. 
This role is very close to the one of credit card companies.  
Aggregation is a source for profit, because aggregators are able to get a margin from their 
role in the market. For instance, they can buy large amounts of connectivity wholesale 
and sell it retail. They also benefit from economies of scale, because they are able to set 
up a more efficient service, able to process a large number of transactions, than individual 
players in the market.  
 Simplified model: one broker 
USER PROVIDER 
BROKER 
payment 
Authorization 
payment 
 
Figure 2-3: Simplified model: one broker 
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As shown in Figure 2-3, the user pays the broker, who then pays the provider. If desired, 
blinding techniques can be used to make these payments anonymous and untraceable so 
that neither the provider nor the broker can track the user.  
 
The relationship between the user and the broker or between the broker and the provider 
can be either short term or long term.  
If it is a short-term relationship, both parties are connected only for the duration of the 
communication. Payments can be settled by micropayments. 
If it is a longer-term relationship, from a few hours to years, parties are bound by some 
kind of contract (e.g. subscription, pre-paid communications, credit card billing, etc). 
The broker is aggregating usage and therefore is transferring some part of the financial 
risk from the user and the provider to itself. 
 
This model is not dependent on the payment system. Payments could be made off-line: 
for instance, the user can pay the broker through a monthly billing, the provider can be 
credited on a monthly basis, and the fund transfer can be aggregated so that the payments 
are not too small. In this case, there is no need to design a specific payment scheme.  
 
In many senses, this scheme is very close to credit card transactions: the user is making a 
payment to the provider through a broker, whose role is close to the role of Visa or 
MasterCard in a credit card transaction. 
It is also very close to roaming agreements between mobile operators: The provider is the 
distant operator, providing services, and the contracted operator is acting like a broker, 
providing only financial services. 
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 Several brokers 
USER PROVIDER 
User’ s 
Broker 
Payment 
Authorization 
Payment 
Provider’ s 
broker 
Fund 
transfer 
 
Figure 2-4: Several brokers 
More generally, we can consider a network of brokers connected to one another, as 
shown in Figure 2-4. The exchanges of money works exactly as in the previous model.  
In this scheme, there are an infinite number of providers and an infinite number of 
brokers.  
However, if there are too many brokers, they will not be able to aggregate enough 
payments to make profitable money transfers. 
2.3.6 Bribes 
 
USER PROVIDER 
3rd PARTY 
Authorization 
payment 
Relationship 
token 
 
Figure 2-5: Bribes 
In the case of bribes, as shown in Figure 2-5, the user is involved into some kind of 
relationship with a 3rd party. For instance, the user may have bought a coffee in a 
Starbucks Coffee, and get 20 minutes of free wireless access. 
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The 3rd party, Starbucks in this example, has to pay back the communication provider. 
 
Another possibility (which is not really a “ bribe”  model anymore) is that the user is an 
employee of a company providing a wireless network to its employee through a distinct 
provider. The company does not have to install and maintain a wireless network, but it 
has to pay the provider for the services. 
 
2.3.7 Distinct groups of users 
USER PROVIDER 
GROUP OF 
PAYING 
USERS 
Free service 
payment 
BROKER 
(optional) 
payment 
payment 
 
Figure 2-6: Distinct group of users 
A group of user may pay to get services in an area. This model is described on Figure 
2-6. For example, a neighborhood association could pay for services all around the 
neighborhood, and let anyone in this place access it without paying. Another example is 
the Advanced Network Architecture group who installed (and paid for) an 802.11b 
wireless network in the Laboratory for Computer Science building, and lets anyone in the 
building access it. 
 
This scheme could also provide a special service to those who paid (e.g. faster or more 
reliable service versus best effort service). We could include a broker between the paying 
users and the provider, or the provider could actually be the paying users, who installed 
and manages the network themselves, as in the example of the ANA network. 
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2.3.8 Summary: transaction models 
These different models provide an insight of the wide spectrum of transaction models 
possible with the Personal Router. Although this list covers many different types of 
models, it is likely that new unpredictable models will emerge as the device develops.  
These models go from simple models, where the user only interacts with the provider, to 
more elaborate models involving several other parties such as brokers and other types of 
third parties.  
We can see from these models that payments will be only a small part of all information 
flows that will occur through the Personal Router. It is important to consider these 
possible models when using payment systems in the Personal Router, to avoid blocking 
possibilities of other transaction models.  
2.4 Summary 
Payment systems are very complex procedures that are difficult to describe. In this 
chapter, Definitions of the actors and the characteristics involved in payment systems 
have been given. The different axes along which it is possible to describe payment 
systems have been presented.  
One of the most important characteristics is privacy. It is also one of the more complex to 
represent. A table is used to describe privacy’ s two main dimensions: to whom the 
information is revealed, and what kind of information is considered. 
The different values that a payment scheme can take along these axes define its different 
characteristics, performances and behaviors. 
To understand to complexity of the world surrounding the Personal Router, different 
transaction models have also been exposed. When implementing new payment system in 
the Personal Router, we must be careful not to rule out any possible payment system that 
could be needed in the future. 
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3 PRIVACY 
Privacy is a key issue raised by the Personal Router. In effect, the Personal Router 
combines three worlds: mobile communications, electronic transactions and the Internet. 
Each of these different layers raises separate issues. The aim of this chapter is to give a 
background in privacy in the context of the Personal Router. Some of these issues are the 
same as in the Internet or in mobile networks today. Personal router users, as well as 
mobile communication users, will face three main threats. First, they will access networks 
through mobile network operator, who will have the ability to learn a lot of information 
about their customers, and in particular their location. Then users will go over insecure 
networks, and will possibly leave a trail. Finally, they will transact over these networks 
with untrusted providers, thus raising privacy threats again.  
 
Others issues will be more specific to the Personal Router, such as the difficulty that 
service providers are unknown, untrusted and numerous compared to today’ s structure of 
mobile communication providers: most users have a contract with only one of them. It is 
much more difficult to make sure that all providers are complying with their privacy 
agreement if they are a lot of providers in the system as it is in the case of the Personal 
Router. Also, the Personal Router will require constant negotiation of payment system 
and services, which is likely to leave a trail easier to follow than in usual communication 
systems.  
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Most of these interactions will happen without the user knowing it or even initiating it. 
For instance, the device could try to check and download emails; it will begin by looking 
for providers, negotiating with them, selecting one of them, paying and downloading 
emails.  
The information released can even be a part of the negotiation. But the user has to be 
careful not to leak information on any of these three parts. If there is a leak, and if other 
parties can correlate the information, then privacy is compromised in all three parts.  
 
In this chapter, we will first define privacy and give a quick background over some 
regulatory aspects of privacy. Then we will go through privacy issues on the web, in 
electronic commerce and in mobile communications, and through some examples that 
have been tried to solve these problems.  
In chapter 4, we will consider only privacy from the payment system standpoint. This 
chapter draws the larger picture of privacy issues.  
3.1 Definitions 
3.1.1 A definition of privacy  
Privacy is the individuals’  right to manage data held by third parties about them, to add, 
modify, or delete entries, and to know and control what use is made of this information. 
 
Personal information is any information related to an individual. It can be a name, an 
address, a phone number, or a national identification number. It can also be a pseudonym 
or any information that could allow third parties to create a profile of this particular user. 
These parties can record the preferences of this particular user, like the kind of web sites 
she likes and the kind of payment she uses. They could also record the general behavior 
of this user, like where she likes to get information on a product, on what kind of banner 
she clicks, what kind of advertising she is sensitive to. 
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Leakage of information occurs when information that should be kept private is released 
and can be obtained by a third party. It is different from information willingly given to a 
third party.  
 
As Agre and Rotenberg explain in (Agre and Rotenberg, 1997), “ the debates about 
privacy are structured as a series of tradeoffs and by the assertion of abstract rights 
(dignity, autonomy, association, self determination) against specific encroachments (each 
accompanied by a compelling justification).”  
 
These abstract rights are very difficult to define in words, and even more difficult to 
define for a computer program. Moreover, they differ depending on the location, cultural 
environment, context, time, etc. For instance, health data are private, except for doctors 
and health insurances, and a worker may hide his salary in certain countries but not in 
others, depending on cultural context. Parents may not want to give any information 
about their children, except to school officials or doctors. 
 
Protecting privacy requires also a very good definition of the needs. For example, a pub 
does not need the name, the address, and the age of a customer to serve alcohol: it needs 
only to be sure that this customer is over 21.  
 
The problem of privacy is even more serious with new technologies. Users are not 
necessarily aware of information leakage because it is more difficult to see. They do not 
understand what information they are conveying, how permanent it is, who can access it, 
and what the intentions of those using this information might be. Users cannot see the 
trail they leave when they apply for services, make payments, browse the Internet.  
 
The problem is to know whether privacy can be efficiently protected, despite several 
articles such as (Meeks, 1999) claiming “ privacy in the digital age is dead” , or Sun 
Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy’ s provocative answer to a journalist in 1999: “ You 
have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.”   
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3.1.2 Stakeholders 
As explained in (Camp, 1999), parties in e-commerce and privacy systems have different 
goals, which are often incompatible. Some of these parties are much more interested in 
what the others do in specific cases. For instance, as soon as money is exchanged, 
governments have a special interest in the transaction.  
 Law enforcement 
Government needs information to accomplish its legitimate purposes such as detection of 
illegal transactions. They fight fraudulent activities, like money laundering, terrorist 
networks, etc. At the same time, they must protect individuals’  right to privacy. 
Increasing data availability makes it easier to detect patterns of illegal activity and pursue 
the appropriate parties.  
 Businesses 
Companies collect information for uses both primary (their own) and secondary 
(somebody else’ s). They have the ability to record information about users, or to ask 
them for personal data. Users do not always benefit directly from these practices. 
Customers prefer a personalized service, but they could also value privacy. Companies 
are not always clear about their intents. 
Businesses are also motivated to record profiles of user because of a profitable secondary 
market for consumer information. 
 System designers and administrators 
They need to collect detailed information on system usage to tune and improve it as much 
as possible. But that information can also be used to spy or invade the privacy of a web 
user. 
 An observer 
An observer may be spying the communication and/or the transaction between a client 
and a server, either to gain access to hidden data, to get private data (what the customer is 
buying, at what price, what is the customer’ s name, etc), or to get sensitive information 
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such as a credit card number. That is why transactions have to be protected, for instance 
by encryption. 
 Banks 
In most cases, banks are the final step to the completion of a transaction. They can often 
access to sensitive data over their customer, which they should not know. Nevertheless, 
banks must know a minimum amount of information on the transaction in order to be able 
to process the transfer of money and avoid money laundering. 
 Users 
Users would like to preserve their privacy. At the same time, they appreciate to receive a 
personalized service. Moreover, their behavior is not always rational. Many surveys have 
shown that privacy is one of their top concerns when buying something on the Internet2; 
yet they seldom take action to fight leaks of privacy, and are often not even aware of 
these leaks. 
 Summary of conflicts between players 
Businesses and system designers would like to know as much information as possible 
about users. This allows them to provide personalized service and targeted advertising, 
and also to design their systems according to predicted users’  behavior.  
Governments and banks need to control some information about transactions in order to 
be able to respond to warrants and to detect illegal patterns. 
Observers do not really need to know anything, but they can try to get their hands on 
private information that could let them access payment tools on behalf of users and to spy 
on other users.  
Users would prefer to keep their personal information as private as possible. They can 
decide to trust one or more of the other parties. 
                                                 
2
 See for instance March 2000 Business Week/Harris Poll 
http://businessweek.com/datedtoc/2000/0012.htm 
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3.2 Background: Privacy in the Law 
The Personal Router is confronted by a complex background in Privacy laws. This 
section gives an overview of several laws in the US and in Europe, and their 
interconnection via the Safe Harbor agreement. The aim of this section is not to be 
extensive on this difficult field, but to point out the complexity of regulations on privacy. 
A comprehensive collection of US and international privacy laws can be found in 
(Rotenberg, 2000).  
 
There are strong disagreements and differences of point of view between the United 
States and the European Union on how to manage citizens’  privacy. A good analysis of 
these divergences can be found in (Agre and Rotenberg, 1997) and in (Rotenberg, 2000). 
In the US, the debate centers on privacy concerns, whereas in the European Community 
the debate concerns data protection. In effect, European regulators assume that they have 
to protect citizens against bad behaviors of corporations; while in the US it is the 
government that is considered as being likely to act badly. Consequently, U.S. regulations 
focus more on governmental agencies’  privacy policies, while European directives are 
more aimed at misuse of personal information by companies. 
 
In particular, in the US, once a person freely chooses to disclose information for a 
specific purpose, this information is no longer considered private and can be disclosed 
generally (secondary use), while the European Union regulation prevents secondary use 
of data. Information collected for a specific purpose cannot be used for another purpose 
without authorization. 
3.2.1 Privacy in the U.S. constitution 
The first thing to be noted is that the word “ privacy”  does not appear anywhere in the US 
constitution. There is no real definition in the constitution of what privacy is and implies. 
 The first and the fourth amendment 
The 1st and the 4th amendment are the most relevant to privacy issues. The 1st amendment 
ensures the meeting right, while the 4th amendment forbids unreasonable searches. 
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The first amendment states: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.” 
 
The first amendment implies privacy, as people under surveillance are not likely to 
assemble and to express views that could be disapproved. 
 
The fourth amendment states: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.” 
 
The fourth amendment creates a region of privacy inviolable by government except in 
constrained circumstances.  
3.2.2 The Privacy Act of 1974 
The Privacy Act of 19743 is the first US text to explicitly address privacy issues. It sets 
fair information principles, and regulates federal government agency record keeping and 
disclosure practices. The Act allows most individuals to seek access to federal agency 
records about themselves. There should be no secret record keeping databases. All 
records must be kept accurate, complete, timely, and must be relevant to the purpose for 
which they are to be used. There should be limits on the collection of personal 
                                                 
3
 http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/privstat.htm ; Public Law 93-579 
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information. Information collected for one purpose may not be used for another purpose 
without notice to or the consent of the subject of the record. Finally, the record-keeper 
should assure a reasonable level of security, and is accountable for compliance with the 
other principles.  
An important amendment was made in 1988 to regulate the “ matching”  of personal data 
among different databases coming from different agencies tying together their computer 
systems. It is possible to do it only if a number of conditions are fulfilled, and cannot 
remain in effect more than 18 months. 
There are also several sector-specific privacy regulations, for instance the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act (1978)4, providing confidentiality for financial records, the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (1986)5, regulating in particular wiretapping, the 
Video Privacy Protection Act (1988)6, dealing with video rentals records, the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act (1991)7, restricting use of automatic telephone dialing systems, 
the Driver’ s Privacy Protection Act (1994)8, prohibiting the release and use of certain 
personal information from State motor vehicle records, or the Children’ s Online Privacy 
Act (1999)9, regulating practices in connection with the collection and use of personal 
information about children on the Internet. 
Despite numerous proposed legislative initiatives, there has been no general framework 
in the US since 1974. 
3.2.3 Privacy in Europe 
 Evolution of privacy policies in Europe since 1970 
The following description of this evolution is inspired from an analysis by Viktor Mayer-
Schönberger in the 8th chapter of (Agre and Rotenberg, 1997). 
 
                                                 
4
 Public Law 95-630 
5
 Public Law 99-508 
6
 Public Law 100-618 
7
 Public Law 102-243 
8
 Public Law 103-322 
9
 Public Law 105-277 
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The first generation data-protection laws originated in 1970s to address the fear of Big 
Brother, that is a single centralized data bank that knows everything about everybody. 
Special institutions were set up to supervise compliance with substantive data-protection 
regulation. The right to access and the right to modify one’ s personal data were 
introduced.  
 
The second generation, at the end of the 70s, comes from a different danger: the fear is 
not a potential Big Brother anymore, but lies now in dispersed data processing by 
thousands of computers across the world. Data protection in the second generation 
focused more on individual privacy rights of the citizen: right to be left alone, right to 
delimit one’ s own personal life (telemarketing), etc.  
 
The third generation, in the 1980s, addresses a different question. It is not whether one 
wanted to participate in societal processes, but how. This guarantees the ability of the 
individual, to decide in general for himself the release and use of his own personal data. 
 
The final generation (early 1990s) tries to equalize bargaining position by strengthening 
the individual’ s position vis-à-vis the generally more powerful information-gathering 
institutions. Moreover, legislators have subjected former data-protection norms to 
mandatory legal protection. This approach reflects the understanding that some areas of 
informational privacy must be absolutely protected and cannot be bargained for 
individually. 
 
The 1995 European Union Directive on Data Protection reflects this general evolution. 
 The 1995 European Union Directive on Data Protection 
As several member states of the European Union have since the 1970s passed legislation 
protecting the rights of individuals to privacy from abuses resulting from the processing 
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of personal data, Directive 95/46/EC10 asked members states of the EU to harmonize 
protection of the right to privacy by the end of 1998. 
These laws apply to any identified or identifiable individual (name, telephone number, 
national identification number, etc).  
 
Data protection laws provide for a series of rights for individuals such as the right to 
receive certain information whenever data are collected, the right to access the data, and 
if necessary, the right to have the data corrected, and the right to object to certain types of 
data processing. Moreover, these laws includes the obligation to use personal data for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes only, the obligation to guarantee the security 
of the data against accidental or unauthorized access or manipulation and in some cases 
the obligation to notify a specific independent supervisory body before carrying out all or 
certain types of data processing operations. Data should be accurate and kept up to date. 
Data controllers are required to take any reasonable step to ensure the rectification or 
erasure of inaccurate data. Finally, data should be kept in a form that permits 
identification of individuals for no longer than it is necessary.  
 
Stricter rules apply for sensitive data, such as ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, union membership and data concerning health or sex life.  
 
These laws normally provide for certain safeguards or special procedures to be applied in 
case of transfers of data outside the EU. They prohibit the transfer of personal data to 
non-European Union nations that do not meet the European standard for privacy 
protection. 
 
The United States is one of these countries. The U.S. Department of Commerce in 
consultation with the European Commission developed a "safe harbor" framework, which 
                                                 
10Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 p. 0031 – 0050 
 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html  
Privacy 
 - 65 - 
was approved by the EU in July 200011. US companies can be certified by applying Safe 
Harbor Principles to their privacy policy and personal data processing. Certified US 
companies avoid interruptions in their business with the EU and/or prosecution by 
European authorities under European privacy laws. About 160 US companies have 
signed up so far (as of March 2002). 
3.3 Privacy issues raised by the Personal Router 
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Figure 3-1: Different levels of interaction with the Personal Router 
The Personal Router raises numerous difficulties regarding privacy. As shown in Figure 
3-1, it interacts with three different levels: The mobile network, the Internet and the 
service providers. It is important to observe that these threats are neither new nor 
different than what exists today. The information released in each level depends on the 
level; it can be either location information at the level of the mobile network, personal 
information at the level of Internet and service providers, and payment-specific 
information at the levels of mobile networks and service providers. The additional issue 
raised by the Personal Router lies in the fact that the three levels are stimulated at the 
same time and get information on users. The danger occurs when it becomes possible for 
                                                 
11
 US site on Safe Harbor (department of Commerce) http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ 
List of companies adhering to the Safe Harbor framework: 
http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list 
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the parties to collude and to merge the partial information they have to create a complete 
profile of the user. These dangers already exist in 3G networks. Nevertheless, as 
explained in section 3.3.3, it is complicated by the fact that there are many mobile access 
providers. 
In this section, we will go over three threats faced by the Personal Router. First, we will 
see the issue of the trail left by users when going over insecure networks. Then we will 
examine the threat coming from transacting with untrusted service providers. Finally, we 
will analyze the threat coming from the fact that users will be mobile and use wireless 
networks.   
3.3.1 Threat of leaving a trail over insecure networks 
The Internet has revolutionized the information world and exchange practices. New 
techniques, such as data-mining or matching databases, are now not only possible, but 
also cheap and easy to perform. Collecting data is easier than ever. The profiling of 
potential customers has always existed. Nevertheless, it has grown to an unknown 
dimension with the development and the generalization of the use of Internet. The 
Personal Router faces similar kinds of issues. Users will benefit from tools already 
existing in the world of the World Wide Web. In this section, we will go over specific 
issues relative to the web and some examples that have been applied to solve them. 
 Profiling of users 
There are two types of behavior from companies trying to get personal information on 
users. The first one is when users reveal some part of personal information and the 
companies do not access anything else. The second one is when users do not actively 
reveal personal information but companies find out ways to obtain this information 
anyway.  
Information can therefore be collected in two different forms. The first one is profiling. 
Profiling is when users are observed and monitored, and information about them is 
collected only by passively recording their actions. On the other hand, personalization is 
when users actively set their preferences and provide information to third parties.  
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Depending on the use of information collected, different parties could benefit from these 
data collections. In some cases, users can get more personalized services from the 
information they gave away. In other, companies use, rent or sell the data collected as 
valuable customer data without much compensation for users.  
 
Users are now scrutinized in depth. Companies such as DoubleClick are able to tell what 
kind of sites a user is likely to visit, what kind of article she is likely to buy, what kind of 
links she may click on (in terms of colors, location on the web page, objects advertised) 
and what are her main interests.  
Moreover, auction sites like eBay.com are able to build a very large database on users, 
revealing for instance reservation prices for many different goods, which is highly 
valuable information.  
Given these databases, advertising can be optimized and personalized. Users get a 
benefit, because they receive advertisements much more personalized, and therefore 
better directed to their needs and wishes. However, this profiling may be too expensive 
for them in terms of invasion of their privacy, compared to the services provided. 
The problem comes from the fact that users cannot entirely decide what information is 
leaked and who gets it. In an ideal world, either there would be no leakage, or the 
information released would be revealed in agreement with the user. This goal is very 
difficult to achieve, because users leave an easily traceable trail, and companies are not 
always clear about their intentions. Several tools try or have tried to help users solve this 
issue. 
 
This information can be revealed by two kinds of tools: tools acting at the IP and HTTP 
levels and cookies.  
 The IP/HTML level 
When a computer makes requests on the Internet in HTML, it gives to web sites a lot of 
personal information12 such as IP address, OS, web browser type, plug-ins available, 
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whether Java is enabled, the size of the screen, domain name, computer name, where 
users prefer to click, what they like, from what site they are coming, etc. 
This information can be retrieved and stored by any web site without the explicit 
knowledge or consent of the user. The user is not actively releasing this information, and 
unwillingly leaves a trail when surfing on the Web. Customizing web browsers and 
checking the personal information released can reduce the amount of data available. 
Nevertheless, it will not block everything, and requires rather strong computer skills.  
 Cookies 
Cookies are very small pieces of information left by web sites on the hard drive of 
individual users. They can store personal information such as name, address, credit card 
number, and/or they can simply store a user ID used to personalize a user visit to a 
website.  
They are three main uses of cookies. First, targeted marketing allows sites to build a 
profile on where individuals go while on the Internet and on their primary interests. The 
second use is web tracking, which means spying the users’  behavior on a particular web 
site and counting exactly how many people have visited a site. Finally, site 
personalization allows users to define preferences, for instance on news, areas of interest, 
or presentation of information. Only the third use is really useful for the user. 
Today’ s browsers offer simplistic ways of dealing with cookies. It is possible to either 
turn them off, restrict them to the owner site, or to turn them on. But this requires to 
understand what cookies are and what they are used to. In addition, some sites condition 
access to the use of cookies. Users have then the choice between turning on cookies and 
no accessing certain web sites. 
 Fighting information leakage  
There are numerous solutions to fight information leakage on the web. They range from 
basic anonymous web browsing to advanced pseudonymous services. A description of 
five typical services researched or currently offered on the Internet follows. These 
services have been chosen to show the spectrum of possible privacy tools accessible. 
These different models correspond to a new potential market: the market of “ Privacy 
Service Providers”  or PSPs. They are classified into three categories: 
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• Negotiation services (e.g. P3P), allowing a web site and a user to agree on private 
information stored and used by the web site. The privacy threat is solved by 
negotiation and trust that parties will respect the agreement concluded at the end 
of this negotiation.  
• Basic anonymous services (e.g. anonymizer.com), providing a simple way to be 
anonymous, but without personalized services. In particular, these services 
systematically block cookies, and block direct access to users’  computer via IP 
and HTML.  
• Advanced services (e.g. zeroknowledge.com’ s freedom), providing anonymity 
through tailor-designed pseudonymity, and allowing users to get personalized 
services. Cookies can be accepted in certain cases, and some information can be 
passed to the distant web site via HTML. But these services provide strong 
pseudonymity, and can change the apparent identity of users very often. Therefore 
they can let users access personalized services without much information leakage. 
 Negotiation services: P3P 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project13 is developed by the World Wide 
Web Consortium14. The aim is to provide a simple and automated way for users to gain 
more control over the use of personal information on Web sites they visit. P3P is a 
description of privacy policies and preference in a machine-readable format. 
On the one hand, the web site visited presents a set of propositions on how it handles 
personal information about its users. On the other hand, the user defines a set of privacy 
preferences. A P3P-enabled web browser compares the proposition of the web site to the 
preferences of the user, and decides whether there are compatible.  
However, there is no enforcement, and the web site does not have to act as declared; so 
the user must trust that the web site is telling the truth. 
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 http://www.w3.org/P3P/  
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 Basic anonymous services 
Basic anonymous services use anonymity as a strategy for protecting privacy. They 
usually offer little or no services apart from providing anonymity. Two services are 
presented here: anonymizer.com, providing a proxy service, and crowds, a research 
project developed by AT&T. 
 Anonymizer.com 
Anonymizer.com15 blocks cookies, Java, JavaScript, and other tracking methods. It 
changes URLs on web pages to make sure links go through its servers. 
The user can then browse the Internet without giving information to any web site he is 
visiting. Anonymizer.com makes the requests to the requested server for the user, and 
then redirects replies to the user. 
 
Nevertheless, the transmission between the anonymizer.com server and the user is not 
secure, and eavesdropping or wire-tapping on the user’ s line is possible. Moreover, it is 
only a proxy service; the server knows perfectly who users are, and what they are doing. 
Moreover, Anonymizer.com is not designed to support private transactions such as 
electronic payments.  
 Crowds 
Crowds16 was developed by AT&T in the mid 90’ s as a research project. It was used only 
on a small scale. This is a good example of a distributed peer-to-peer privacy enhancer.  
The approach is based on the idea of hiding one's actions within the actions of many 
others. To execute web transactions in this model, a user first joins a crowd of other 
users. The user's initial request to a web server is first passed to a random member of the 
crowd. That member can either submit the request directly to the end server or forward it 
to another randomly chosen member, and in the latter case the next member 
independently chooses to forward or submit the request. When the request is eventually 
submitted, it is submitted by a random member, thus preventing the end server from 
identifying its true initiator. Even crowd members cannot identify the initiator of the 
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 http://www.anonymizer.com 
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 http://www.research.att.com/projects/crowds/ 
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request, since the initiator is indistinguishable from a member that simply passed on a 
request from another.  
 
There are two major privacy and security issues. 
The first risk is that each computer sends requests that the user did not initiate, which 
may raise some problems. A second risk of running Crowds is that by routing requests 
through others’ machines, Crowds may increase the risk of disclosure of the data in the 
request and corresponding reply.  
  
This last issue implies that this system is intended more for browsing than shopping. In 
fact, this system completely fails if it is used for shopping, as all the information involved 
in the transaction (credit card number, address, name, etc) would be known by every 
member forwarding the request (Crowds doesn’ t support encryption). 
 Advanced services: pseudonyms 
More advanced services use pseudonymity instead of pure anonymity. This allows the 
user to get personalized services without revealing personal information. The user can use 
different pseudonyms while browsing on the Internet, which cannot be connected to each 
other. Services considered here are LPWA developed by Lucent Technologies as a 
research project, and Freedom.net, a virtual private network providing privacy developed 
by zeroknowledge.com.  
 LPWA 
The Lucent Personalized Web Assistant17 (LPWA) was a technology demonstration by 
Lucent Technologies. This project has now ended. It was created in 1997. 
The aim of LPWA was to provide personalized and anonymous access to web servers, 
including emails. It would allow users to get personalized services on web sites like 
Yahoo!, and get emailed newsletter without giving personal information. It uses aliases. 
An alias is a username, a password and an email address. Different aliases are presented 
to different web sites, making aggregating data impossible. They cannot be correlated. 
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These aliases are secure, consistent, and are not stored on LPWA’ s servers. 
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Figure 3-2: A description of the LPWA scheme 
As shown in Figure 3-2, LPWA consists of three functional components: The persona 
generator, the browsing proxy, and the email forwarder. The persona generator generates 
a unique, consistent site-specific persona on demand by a user. The user provides a real 
email address and a secret. Using a cryptographic operation with the user’ s email address 
and secret, and the destination web site domain name, the persona generator computes a 
persona for this user, which is consistent to this web site and does not need to be stored 
on the server; in fact, it is recomputed each time the user access the web site. 
The browsing proxy indirects connections on the TCP level and filters headers on the 
HTTP level. The email forwarder forwards mails addressed to a LPWA persona to the 
real user. 
 
When a web site asks a user for her username, password or email address, the user simply 
types the appropriate escape sequence (\u for username, \p for password, and \@ for 
email address). The LPWA proxy then recreates the user’ s persona for this particular web 
site, and replaces escape sequence by the correspondent element. 
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This system does not allow users to conduct anonymous transactions. It provides only 
highly personalized services and anonymity. Personalization and anonymity are then 
reconciled.  
 Freedom 
Zero Knowledge18 is a Canadian company working on privacy issues. It used to provide a 
free piece of software, Freedom, and to sell pseudonymous identities to be used with this 
software. Zero Knowledge has now changed its business, and sells privacy tools to 
companies and different web protecting tools and personal firewalls to individuals.  
 
Freedom19 protects privacy by proxying the various supported protocols, and sending 
those proxied packets through a private network before they are deposited on the Internet 
for normal service. This private network is operated by Zero Knowledge and consists of a 
set of Freedom server nodes that make up the Freedom Network, and the Freedom Core 
Servers that provide basic services. The Freedom network is a virtual network using 
encrypted tunnels over public Internet. Server nodes are either operated by Zero 
Knowledge or by third party operators running a Freedom daemon on their servers. The 
network transports encrypted IP traffic from one node to the next. The number of nodes 
used in a route is chosen by the user by setting her security level in the Freedom client. 
The server nodes themselves are not linked by a fixed topology, instead, they can 
communicate with any other server node on the network, as requested by a client when 
creating a route. Freedom also prevents server operators from knowing who is using 
Freedom and what messages say. In effect, link encryption is applied between node pairs 
in order to hide the nature and characteristics of the traffic between them. Nevertheless, 
increasing the number of servers used in a route raises issues of latency and scalability. 
Nyms are the identities (pseudonyms) that Freedom users assume on the Internet. A nym 
is defined an identity (e.g. John Smith), by a unique email address at freedom.net and the 
associated digital signature key.  
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A nym is created when a user sends a nym creation token, a signature verification key 
and an encryption public key to the nym server. These can be purchased independently to 
ensure untraceability. The Freedom network is supposed to be unable to trace back nyms. 
Incoming mail for nyms is received by a freedom mail gateway. Then they are encrypted 
and delivered to the nym user through the Freedom network.  
 
Private transactions are not supported, but it provides secure channels such as SSL.  
 Conclusions: Privacy on the Web 
There are real privacy issues on the Internet today. They have roots in personalization and 
profiling. Both are necessary to provide the consumer with a tailored service. 
Nevertheless, hidden costs paid by users in terms of privacy invasion may be considered 
as too high compared to the benefits. Information leaking out of each click users make on 
the Internet is a real asset for companies.  
That is why many start-ups were created on this potential privacy market, trying to sell 
products protecting users’  privacy. Almost all of them have failed or have changed their 
business, like Zero Knowledge, the most promising of them, did.  
Different surveys show that Internet users are still very concerned about their privacy. 
For instance, a March 2000 Business Week/Harris Poll20 survey showed that users feel 
privacy invasion as a growing threat over the Internet. 78% of the users who shop and 
94% of those who do not are somewhat or very concerned about their privacy online. 
 
Nevertheless, the failure of most the privacy enhancing technologies show either that the 
right way to do it has not been found yet, or that most consumers are not willing to pay to 
protect their privacy.  
3.3.2 Threats in electronic transactions 
Transacting over a network and over Internet in particular raises several issues that are 
close to ones encountered by the Personal Router. However, the Personal Router raises 
issues that are slightly different. In effect, the Personal Router e-commerce transactions 
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will often be limited to a simple payment for connectivity, which does not carry all the 
burden of conducting a transaction for a real good over the Internet. In effect, there is a 
big difference between transaction for tangible goods (e.g. buy a book) and intangible 
goods (e.g. network services). Much more information is needed to complete a 
transaction on tangible goods, such as name, address, and usually phone number.  
The difficulty of e-commerce comes from the fact that in addition to all the information 
exchanged before and during the transaction, financial data is exchanged. This is a very 
sensitive piece of information, which implies a special treatment.  
 
Electronic commerce includes electronic payment. Electronic payments are designed and 
optimized for a specific use. They also have different privacy characteristics. Privacy has 
a cost, as it implies implementing additional computations and interactions between the 
different entities taking part in the transaction. Therefore, electronic payment schemes 
offer usually little or no privacy if the amount to be transferred is too small (e.g. micro-
payment schemes such as Millicent or MicroMint). The marginal cost of the transaction 
is too high compared to the amount to be transferred. 
 
On the other hand, DigiCash21 is totally anonymous and uses blinding techniques to 
provide this anonymity. Nevertheless, this anonymity may raise issues, as the transaction 
is not consistent; for instance, if there is a system failure in the middle of the transfer of 
the product sold, the merchant has no way to recognize the real buyer. There is no 
mechanism for conflict resolution22. 
 
Privacy is therefore a sensitive issue in commerce. The Personal Router will face the 
same kind of problems. However, they will be simplified most of the time by the fact that 
the good bought is connectivity, which is much easier to sell privately than real goods. In 
effect, there is no shipping, thus no need to exchange shipping specific information such 
as name or address. 
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 http://www.digicash.com  
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 Nevertheless, L. Jean Camp, Michael Harkavy, Bennet Yee, and J. D. Tygar, in (Camp, et al, 1996), have 
proven that it is possible to create an anonymous payment system while providing strong ACID (atomic, 
consistent, isolated, durable) transactional properties. 
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In this section, two very different approaches to privacy in electronic commerce are 
discussed. The first one is Microsoft Passport, who is collaborating and trusting third 
parties. This approach is sometimes called Personal Data Provider. The other approach is 
a scheme to conduct anonymous transaction over the Internet with real goods. 
 Microsoft Passport 
Microsoft Passport23 is an example of a personal information manager. Microsoft 
passport offers two services. The first one is a “ single sign-in”  service, which enables 
users to have one name and password at all participating websites. This is the .NET 
passport. The second service is the “ .NET Passport express purchase.”  The user stores 
sensitive personal information such as personal address, credit card number, etc in a 
“ .NET Passport Wallet.”  This service provides a faster checkout by using the information 
stored once for all in this .NET passport Wallet.  
This approach let Microsoft manage all personal information of users. Users have to trust 
that Microsoft will keep this information secure and will not share with third parties 
without the consumers’  consent. As this is a collaborative organization, users have also to 
trust that third party web sites will not misuse the information they can access to about 
.NET Passport users.  
Microsoft Passport is a good example of a “ Personal Data Provider.”  A Personal Data 
Provider can be seen as a bank: people give their personal data to store, and data banks 
are supposed to keep them secure. This service has a price, that the users pay by letting 
this bank conduct a business with this personal information.  
 Examples of anonymous transaction systems  
In the case of real goods (e.g. a book or a computer) bought on the Internet, the good has 
to be shipped. This implies that the merchant has to know the name and the address of the 
buyer. A few schemes, like Iprivacy and Incogno SafeZone, can be totally anonymous 
(the merchant cannot learn anything on the buyer). The buyer chooses the goods she 
wants to buy and checks out through the server of the trusted third party. In return, she 
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gets a certificate that she paid. She gives this certificate and her name and address 
encrypted with the public key of the transportation company to the merchant. Although 
he merchant knows which good was bought, he is unable to identify the buyer. The 
merchant then gives the product to the transportation company, with only the encrypted 
message. The delivery company can decrypt the buyer’ s name and address, but is unable 
to find out what goods were bought. The buyer has purchased and received goods without 
revealing personal information to the e-merchant. 
 Privacy and transactions 
Privacy in electronic transaction is examined in depth in chapter 2. However, the threat 
comes from the fact that a lot of personal information is exchanged in order to complete 
the transaction. In the context of real goods, this information includes address and other 
shipping information. The Personal Router does not have to deal with this particular 
information, but it has still to find a way to transact privately. The two previous examples 
are interesting because they show two very different approaches to do that with two 
different philosophies.  
3.3.3 Threats in wireless communications 
 Potential issues 
In addition to all the other privacy issues which exists on other communications systems 
such as telephones or the Internet, wireless communications add one of the most sensitive 
personal data: Location. This information, aggregated with other sensitive information 
like names, phone numbers dialed, online activities, etc., constitutes a very accurate 
profile of anybody monitored for some reason. 
 
Two other problems may come from identification and transmission. The network needs 
identification. In effect, the service provider must identify the user (up to a point) for 
billing and for directing calls and communications. In effect, if a customer is called or 
receives an email, the provider must be able to direct the communication up to the user, 
and therefore must be able to identify and locate the user inside a cell. Moreover, the 
transmission medium is the air, which is even easier to listen to than a wire. As a result, 
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the transmission must be protected as much as possible (using strong cryptographic 
techniques) in order to provide privacy and to prevent anyone from using someone else’ s 
registration. Finally, future mobile network (2.5G and 3G networks) will launch mobile 
commerce services, implying transactions and payments. This will be close to the 
problems faced by the Personal Router; the difference will be that users will interact with 
only one provider. 
A particularity of the Personal Router is that users are likely to interact with a large 
number of providers. This implies that it will be much more difficult to trust a provider. 
In effect, when large companies like Verizon provide mobile services, law enforcement is 
relatively easy, because there are few companies providing this services and a large 
number of customer for each company. Therefore, these companies are likely to act 
according to regulations. However, in the case of a market with a large number of small 
providers, it will not be easy to make sure that every single provider complies with laws. 
Thus, the Personal Router needs to be able to provide this trust without any pre-existing 
trust relationship with the provider.  
This problem is reduced by the disaggregation of providers. The large number of 
providers makes it much more difficult for them to collude and to exchange information 
to build a more complete profile of a particular user.  
 Location services 
Location services constitute a potential market for mobile services. The first application, 
and the first incentive, is the enhanced 911. In effect, under Phase II of E911 
implementation, wireless communications carriers must be able to locate 911 callers 
within one-tenth of a mile (a 125 meter radius) in 67% of all cases. Implementations of 
Phase II have begun since October 1, 2001. Some technologies use triangulation 
techniques, other take advantage of the GPS. 
The communication carriers are investing to upgrade their network and to meet FCC’ s 
requirement for this enhanced 911. In addition to these requirements, location-based 
services constitute potentially a huge market. Although it is very difficult to foresee what 
the killer application of location-based services will be, it is more likely that there will be 
many different applications created by network operators. They could provide the right 
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service and the pertinent information at the right time. Useful services could include 
navigation, reservation, ordering, home and local information, travel information, end-
user assistance services, asset or people tracking, all based on user’ s actual location. 
The network could also automatically initiate services depending on the user’ s location, 
for example advertising services, location-based billing and filtering, etc. 
 
These services should ensure the user’ s privacy. For instance, in the case of location-
based advertising, Starbucks Coffee should be able to advertise by giving coupons 
without knowing anything of the potential customer walking near the shop. This will be 
done according to mobile companies’  policies and agreements with users.  
 Services and applications: Mobile Commerce 
With the forthcoming third generation mobile networks, the possible range of 
applications will be enlarged. The services that are the most concerned with privacy are 
of course m-commerce and location based services. Negotiating and paying for services 
(location-based or not) leave a trail easy to track if it is not protected.  
 
If m-commerce is to become a leading driver of the success of future mobile networks, 
users trust the system, and have no concerns about the security and the privacy of the 
system and the methods of payment. If they have any fear that their personal information 
will not be protected, network operator might have a lot of troubles creating a demand for 
this market.  
3.4 Conclusion: Privacy and the Personal Router 
Privacy is a real concern for the communication world to come through all the coming 
new technologies. The issues raised are very similar in different fields and tools deployed 
to handle them usually lack of efficiency. The main flaw of these tools is that they are 
unable to take into account the context and the environment of the user, and the evolution 
of these parameters.  
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The question is the value of privacy. Customers may prefer to be served and to get 
personalized services. At the same time, they sometimes would like to be left alone by 
merchants. These personalized services have a cost, usually paid by the merchants, in 
exchange for a certain amount of personal information that allow them to optimize their 
advertising strategy and the design of their website. Therefore, there is a trade-off 
between personalization, privacy, and the price of the services provided. If customers do 
not want to release personal information, they will have to pay to get personalized 
services. 
 
Privacy is regularly cited as a major concern for consumers. However, they have little 
understanding of the risks and little inclination to change their behavior.  
Instead of paying for additional privacy related services, it is more likely that consumers 
will demand that their tools automatically protect their privacy as much as possible. This 
is the path chosen for instance by Microsoft with the release of the sixth version of 
Internet Explorer, which is able to manage cookies and personal data much more subtly 
than previous releases. However, it is likely that very few users use these additional 
privacy features, because of their complexity. Privacy protection must be invisible for 
users. They should just have to trust the instruments they use to interact on the Internet 
and in the real world to guarantee privacy for them. 
 
The Personal Router must face all these multiple aspects of privacy. Privacy is a very 
hard problem, and the Personal Router makes it ever more complex. In the framework 
described in chapter 4, we will try to address some of these issues in the case of 
electronic transactions.  
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4 PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR THE PERSONAL ROUTER 
The Personal Router has several important differences with other payment systems. Most 
payment systems are usually focused on the merchant’ s side. They are designed so that it 
offers financial guarantees and a certain ease of use for the merchant. Of course, 
consumers are also considered, they will not use the system if it is too complicated. But 
many payment systems are based on a model where the merchant is known and well 
established, and sometimes has to be registered as a merchant in the system.  
In the Personal Router model, the relation is much more symmetric. The provider, 
assuming here the role of merchants, can be anyone with an 802.11b antenna on the roof, 
and may not provide services on a regular basis. Therefore, the system has to be very 
easy to enter for both providers and users. The barriers of entry have to be very low, and 
payment systems should not create additional difficulty. A close to ideal existing system 
is for example PayPal. This system is easy to enter, the payer and the payee can play 
symmetric roles, and the payee does not have to be registered as a payee.  
Another requirement for the Personal Router comes from the fact that the system is based 
on decentralization. Therefore, there will be potentially a very large number of providers, 
and thus a very large number of payment options. This is strengthened by the fact that the 
values exchanged can be very small. 
That is why most existing payment systems do not really fit well into the Personal Router 
model. In this chapter, we will first examine several possible business models for the 
Personal Router. Then we will introduce a decomposition of payment systems into a set 
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of primitive components. This framework will simplify the evaluation and the 
construction of new payment systems. 
4.1 Introduction to primitive operations 
The Personal Router model implies that a very large number of providers will interact 
with a very large number of users. This model will be less likely to develop if only a 
fixed number of predefined payment systems are available. In effect, the diversity of 
transaction models that could exist in the Personal Router system, demonstrated in 
section 2.3, suggests that a large number of possibilities of payment are necessary. Users 
will negotiate and transact with very different providers, merchants, and brokers. The 
context will change in the short term as they are moving and changing their needs for 
service. Thus, limiting the number of payment systems to be used will reduce the 
flexibility of the Personal Router system and its ability to respond accurately to the needs 
of the parties.  
To be able to compare and select any payment system, a comprehensive framework is 
needed. This framework must allow parties to select and negotiate payment systems to 
conduct a particular transaction. This will be done according to predefined constraints 
and preferences from both sides.  
 
Most approaches to payment systems compare payment properties as a whole. This has a 
number of drawbacks. First, it requires a complete examination of a payment scheme to 
extract its properties. Payment schemes are very complex and are not easy to analyze. 
This is therefore a high level task, not easy to perform automatically. Secondly, there are 
many ways of building a payment scheme; therefore, two payment schemes will not be 
easy to compare. Finally, changing one property of a payment system is likely to require 
rebuilding a whole new system.  
 
Instead of studying payment systems as a whole, this thesis proposes to approach 
payment systems by decomposing them into primitive operations. A primitive operation 
is defined as an operation that performs a basic function during the payment procedure. 
Six primitive operations are defined here: authentication, authorization, transfer, record 
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keeping, aggregation, and timing. These primitives can be combined to create an entity 
that replicates the original payment system.  
This model of payment systems has several advantages over the traditional approach. 
First of all, instead of defining a taxonomy of complete payment systems, we can define a 
taxonomy of these primitives. Although it is true that each primitive will be implemented 
in a different way depending on the payment system, it is possible to observe classes of 
primitives acting almost identically and having the same types of properties. Then, by 
compiling the properties of each primitive involved, we can derive the properties of the 
payment system. Therefore, a comparison of two payment schemes is done very easily by 
comparing their primitive elements.  
Secondly, once a payment system is decomposed into these primitive elements, it 
becomes very easy to modify its properties by interchanging one primitive.  
Finally, the combination of these two advantages creates a favorable framework for 
negotiation. Starting from pre-defined payment systems, it is very easy to change their 
properties by changing their primitives. These modifications can takes place as the result 
of requirements from one or more parties involved, and can evolve depending on 
negotiation of the properties of the payment.  
In the next section, attributes are defined. Then, primitives are examined and their main 
classes are exposed. 
4.2 Selection of a payment scheme: attributes 
Users need a way to express their requirements and their preferences. Conversely, the 
main properties of payment systems need to be given in a standardized from, which 
would allow them to be compared more accurately. This is a difficult issue, because of 
three main problems. First, as shown in the previous chapters, there are many properties 
that can help understand how a payment system was designed and how it performs. 
However, these properties are not always relevant to a user. This may be because users do 
not even know their existence, or just that this is not important to them. The one that are 
important are the one that users perceive and are concerned about. Most users are not 
aware of these properties and do not want to be. They cannot define their preferences in 
terms understandable by a machine. Nevertheless, they are able to make judgments in 
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terms of high-level characteristics such as privacy, delay, interface, security, complexity, 
etc.  
In addition, depending on user preferences and environmental constraints, some 
characteristics become more or less important. For instance, for a user trying to pay via 
electronic payment with a GSM mobile handset, communication and computation costs 
will be much more important than it would be if this same user was working on her PC at 
home with a DSL connection. 
That is why selecting a payment system means that the device must understand the 
limitations of the world around it, understand the high-level decisions of the user, and try 
to match the best payment system available.  
4.2.1 Definition 
First, we define the interesting attributes of primitives and payment systems. These 
attributes are the one that users can perceive and that are important to them. 
We call “ attributes”  the values taken for each of the properties considered in the 
following sections. These values can be either a precise value (e.g. executing this 
primitive costs 5 cents) or a range (e.g. this needs at least 10 kbps).  
 
A difficulty comes from the fact that attributes are not static. They are dynamic and 
interdependent. In effect, they could vary depending on external conditions and on values 
of other attributes. In the following definitions, these dependencies are described.  
 
Most of these attributes can characterize properties of primitives and payment systems. 
However, some properties will be impossible to derive from the study of primitives, and 
only an analysis of the complete scheme can provide them. 
We first define those attributes that will define primitives and payment systems. 
Attributes relative to complete payment systems only are examined afterwards. 
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4.2.2 Attributes of both primitives and complete payment 
schemes 
We examine here the properties that will be used to set attributes of primitives. They can 
also be used to describe a complete payment system. From these attributes, it will be 
possible to infer the attributes of the complete payment system. Some of these properties 
will be meaningless for a few primitives; in this case, they will be left blank.  
A payment system is a combination of primitives. Computing the value of an attribute for 
the payment system from the values of attributes of its primitives can be done via 
different basic operations, such as addition, minimum, maximum. The type of operation 
is specified for each attribute.  
 Environmental constraints 
Environmental constraints are the constraints seen by the user interface making the 
payment scheme decision. These constraints limit what it is possible to do. The main 
environmental constraints are computation power, communication capacity, type of user 
interface, and time.  
 User device 
 Computation power 
Some primitives may not work properly on devices having low computational capacities 
such as cell-phones or smart cards. This may incur large delays or even the impossibility 
to complete the transaction. 
This attribute represents the minimum amount of computational power required, 
measured in operations/second. 
The attribute for the payment scheme is the maximum of the attributes of the primitives.  
Low means that a device like a cell phone or a smart card with a low computation power 
is sufficient; High means that a device with superior computational power is required.  
This attribute trades off against time, because a device with low computational power 
may be sufficient if time is not an issue. It is also affected by the load of the device at the 
moment when the primitive is executed.  
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 User Interface 
The type of user interface is very important. It may limit the possibilities of choice. For 
example, if the UI does not have any keyboard or another device through which it is 
possible to enter a PIN, the user cannot enter a PIN code or a password. For instance, a 
microphone and a voice recognition system would allow the user to authenticate herself 
by spelling the PIN code.  
This attribute reflects the minimum type of interface to conduct the operation.  
The value of this attribute for the payment system is the addition of the attributes of the 
primitives. For instance, if one primitive needs a screen and another one a keyboard, then 
the complete system will need a screen and a keyboard. 
 Communication bandwidth 
If communication bandwidth is low or expensive, payment systems requiring a high 
communication capacity may not work properly because of delays or because of 
economical constraints.  
This property is defined as the minimum amount of communication bandwidth required, 
measured in bits/second. 
The attribute for the payment scheme is the maximum of the attributes of the primitives.  
Low means that a small bandwidth, like the one available on a device like a GSM phone 
(a few tens of kilobytes per second) is sufficient; High means that a device with superior 
communication capabilities, like a DSL or a cable line, is required.  
Like computation, this attribute trades off against time, because a device with low 
communication capabilities may be sufficient if time is not an issue.  
 Time 
Time may be critical in some cases, and be unimportant in other. An example where time 
is important is when a Personal Router is negotiating services with a new provider, while 
the user is on a phone conversation (roaming). The negotiation and the payment must be 
done very quickly to avoid interrupting the communication.  
This property is defined as the minimum amount of time required, measured in second. 
The attribute for the payment scheme is the sum of the attributes of the primitives.  
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Time is highly dependent on other attributes like computational power and 
communication bandwidth. 
Three levels are set for this attribute: Quick, Medium and Slow. These levels are just 
comparative. The aim is to give orders of magnitude and to have relative values. To give 
an idea of their meaning, we give here a more precise definition with an evaluation of 
these values.  
Quick means that the transaction can be completed in about one second or less; it means 
that users do hardly perceive the delay. Medium means that it can be completed in about 
one minute; users perceive the delay, but it is short enough for them to wait. Slow means 
that the transaction needs a few days to complete; the completion of the transaction is too 
slow; users have to wait a long time, and will move or do something else before the 
transaction is completed.  
 User preferences 
These preferences are much too complicated for a user. Even so, they are still important 
for the user in one form or another. The following properties are the one seen by the end-
user, as opposed to more internal properties seen only by designers. They are organized 
in three main categories: economical, technical and social aspects. A fourth category, 
regulatory aspects, could be added. Regulations could force users to choose one or the 
other of the properties. 
 Economical aspects 
 Fixed costs 
This property represents the fixed cost of adopting a particular system for each of the 
primitives. This cost depends on registration costs, cost of required hardware, installation 
costs, etc. It is the cost in US dollars of the necessary equipment.  
The attribute for the payment scheme is the sum of the attributes of the primitives.  
This trades off against most of the other attributes. For instance, users could have a 
choice between buying a basic GSM cell phone with small computational power, poor 
communication capabilities, and a monochrome screen capable of printing only a few 
characters. On the other hand, they could choose a fancier device with GPRS or 3G 
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capabilities, a big color screen capable of showing graphics and a processor sufficient to 
handle a graphical interface and high-speed computations.  
The values for this attribute can be none if there is no special hardware required and no 
paying registration; low if these costs are of a few dollars, and high if they are over a 
hundred dollars.  
 Transaction cost 
This property represents the marginal cost of the execution of the primitive, measured in 
US dollars. 
The attribute for the payment scheme is the sum of the attributes of the primitives.  
According to the previous chapters, these costs can be broken up into computation costs, 
communication costs, administrative costs and fraud costs.  
Once again, this cost is highly dependent on other attributes. For instance, users may pay 
a premium for using a high-speed communication link to speed up the transaction; they 
could also pay a premium to reduce fraud risks.  
Transaction costs can be zero if the user does not have to pay anything for the transaction. 
It can be small if the marginal cost is a few cents, and high if it is above one dollar.  
 Fraud risk 
This property represents the estimation of the fraud risk coming from each of the 
primitives. This is different from the fraud risk of the complete transaction, described in 
section 4.2.3.  
 Technical aspects 
 Transaction time 
The attribute represents the length of time during which the user needs to act or wait 
while the operation is processing. In other words, this represents the user-perception of 
the time taken by the transaction to complete. It is measured in seconds. 
The attribute for the payment scheme is the sum of the attributes of the primitives.  
This is also dependent on other attributes, like computational power, user interface, or 
communication capabilities.  
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Time is highly dependent on other attributes like computational power and 
communication bandwidth. 
Three levels are set for this attribute: Quick, Medium and Slow. They have the same 
meaning as the attribute Time defined in the previous section. 
 Non-refutable 
The parties involved in the transaction have a proof that the transaction took place, and 
can prove the details of the transaction such as amount, date and other data relative to the 
transaction.  
This property is true if the execution of the primitive is non-refutable, and false if not.  
The attribute for the payment scheme is the true if the attributes of all primitives are true, 
false if not.  
 Security 
This property measures whether the system is tamper-resistant, and is not easily stolen, 
and makes fraudulent action more difficult. It is measured as the time needed to break the 
system. 
It depends on security measures taken by each of the primitives. The level of security of 
the total transaction is the minimum of all attributes of the primitives used (as an analogy, 
the strength of a chain is the strength of its weakest link). 
Security could be a function of time constraints and computational power; if the device is 
capable of doing strong cryptographic operations in a short time, the security could be 
strengthened. 
 Social aspects 
 Unobtrusive 
This attribute measures the number of steps the user has to take to complete a primitive.  
This property is particularly important for micropayment, because users do not want to be 
prompted each time they spend 2 cents.  
The attribute of the payment scheme will be the sum of the attributes of the primitives 
used. 
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 Privacy and anonymity 
The privacy analysis is very important, and cannot be summarized in a single attribute. 
This property has multi-dimensional aspects, which often requires a deeper analysis. 
For each of the primitives, it is possible to draw a table representing the privacy 
properties of the primitive, as shown in section 2.2.13. The attribute is this 
multidimensional table. Users would define, directly or through a smart agent and a user 
interface, what information they are ready to give and what information they would like 
to keep private for each box of the table. The decision maker algorithm would then have 
to select a matching primitive from the comparison of the user’ s table and the table of the 
primitive. 
The attribute of the payment system is the addition computed for each box of the table for 
each of the primitives. For instance, if a primitive reveals the name of the payer and 
another reveals her address, then the resulting payment system will reveal the name and 
the address.  
4.2.3 Attributes of the complete system 
These attributes can only be defined at the level of the transaction, because they require a 
level of analysis higher than the one offered by primitives. The following attributes 
express fundamental mechanisms of payment systems, relative to others. Therefore, in 
the previous list, they would all appear in the section “ economical aspects.”  
 Interoperable 
A payment system is interoperable if it is easy to convert to other payment systems. 
 Two-way payment 
The system can be used to pay or to receive a payment; there is no registered merchant or 
customer status. This property is also called peer-to-peer payment. 
 Immediately respendable 
In the case of token money, coins can be re-spent immediately; they do not need to be 
redeemed. 
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In the case of notational money, it is possible to use the money as soon as the transaction 
is completed.  
 Actual payment time 
Depending on the payment system, the user’s account can be debited/credited at a 
different time.  
4.2.4 Use of the attributes 
The attributes are interdependent, and in addition depend on external variables like the 
workload on the processor, or the available bandwidth on the communication link. 
Moreover, the attributes of a primitive depend on its particular implementation. 
Therefore, comparing primitives and attributes is not easy.  
However, it is possible to compare relative values of classes of attributes. From the 
analysis of classes, it is possible to derive general values of attributes like “ small”  or 
“ high.”  Thus, a first selection can be made, depending on the requirements of a specific 
transaction. Then, between the remaining implementations of primitives, a more precise 
analysis can be made on the fly at runtime to decide which one of them has the best 
properties. At this point of the process, it is possible to put actual numbers on the 
different attributes, and therefore it is possible to compare accurately different primitives. 
4.3 Description of Payments with Primitive Elements 
In this section, we define in depth each of the six primitive operations. Their attributes are 
highlighted for each specific case. We will first introduce three primitive objects, which 
will be used by the primitive operations. 
4.3.1 Primitive objects 
The idea is to create primitive objects, which could be viewed as classes in object-
oriented programming.  
These objects can be called and used by primitive functions. They hold different types of 
information, and can be access by primitive functions in read only or read write mode, 
depending of the relationship between the function and the object.  
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The following objects are defined here: 
1. State 
2. Identity / Credentials 
3. Transaction 
 State 
 Definition 
This object stores the current state of the payment system and its different parameters. 
For instance, it could store the identity of the other parties, the result of different 
negotiation that took place earlier, and other information relevant to the transaction.  
 Identity / credentials 
 Definition 
This object symbolizes the possible identity of an entity taking part in the transaction. 
This object possesses all the different ways of authenticating a particular entity. It is able 
to use this data depending on the context. It knows all the personal information and the 
credentials of the entity it is working for. Such an object is delicate to handle. There are 
huge issues of security: should this object be stolen or broken, all personal information of 
the user would be revealed. This object may not have to exist, it may be only a way to 
model interactions.  
 Examples 
This object would know the private/public key pair of the user in a PKI system, would 
store temporary identities created for specific transactions, would store hash trees for 
hash authentications, etc. It would also know a lot of information about the user, like 
name, address, etc.  
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 Transaction  
 Definition 
A transaction object defines the source and the destination of the transfer, as well as its 
parameters (e.g. encrypted or not, encryption key, encoding, etc). An identity object may 
be passed along to define some of these parameters. A transaction object contains all the 
data representing the actual transaction; it contains the coin if it is an e-cash transaction, 
and just data if it is a notational scheme.  
4.3.2 Primitive operations 
A primitive operation is an operation that performs a basic function during the payment 
procedure.  
 
Six primitive operations are defined: 
1. Authentication 
2. Authorization 
3. Transfer 
4. Record keeping 
5. Aggregation 
6. Timing 
 
The function described is high-level; therefore, there may be many implementations of it, 
and each of these implementations can act very differently. The attributes of these 
operations greatly depend on the implementation. It is possible to classify these 
implementations in different classes. Implementations in the same classes will have 
similar attributes.  
For each of the primitives, the description of the different classes is followed by a table 
summarizing the attributes of these classes. Attributes are expressed here in fuzzy terms 
like “ small,”  “ medium”  or “ high.”  Each real implementation should be able to put actual 
numbers on them; this table is just there to give orders of magnitude. 
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 Authentication 
 Definition 
Authentication is the operation by which two entities exchange credentials to prove that 
they are who they say they are, or that they belong to a particular group. Authentication 
can be done without revealing personal data.  
For example, I could use authentication to prove that I am John Doe, and/or that I am an 
MIT student. A payment server could prove that it is a genuine payment server.  
The spectrum of authentication is wide. There may be several levels of authentication. It 
could go to "I am John Doe" to "I am the same person you met last week" or "I belong to 
this group."  
From the perspective of a particular user, authentication can mean two very different 
things. It could be either authenticating herself to somebody else, by showing credentials 
proving her identity, or authenticating someone else by verifying the presented 
credentials.  
 Functional diagram 
 
Authentication 
Type of 
identity to be 
authenticated, 
credentials 
Authenticated / 
not authenticated 
Identity object 
 
Figure 4-1: Diagram of primitive Authentication 
Figure 4-1 shows the functional diagram of primitive Authentication.  
 Classes 
The attributes of the following classes are summarized in Table 4-1. 
 "Human" authentication 
Payment systems for the Personal Router 
 - 95 - 
In most cases of real-life payments, authentication is done by human beings. It could be 
physically authenticating a customer in a bank, certifying a bank note, or authenticating a 
written signature. This type of authentication requires no computation and no 
communication (except for the case of a check that has to be physically sent to the issuing 
bank). 
Fraud is possible if a bank note or a written signature can be forged. 
This method of authentication cannot be used on-line. However, it is possible to use it at 
an early stage of the scheme, for example during the initialization. For instance, users 
could have to present their driver’ s license to get access to the system.  
 Biometrics 
Biometrics uses measurable biological characteristics such as fingerprints, voiceprints, 
eyeprints, face recognition, etc, to authenticate the user. It needs a special hardware 
device to verify that these biological characteristics match the user. Biometrics is not 
widely used, but represent an important way to authenticate users, and it could be 
potentially more used in the future.  
 User ID + Password authentication 
Users are authenticated by presenting a user ID and a password. This method is 
commonly used on the Internet when accessing a web site. For instance, PayPal uses this 
method to authenticate its users. This is also the method used by credit card systems 
when users have to enter their Personal Identification Number (PIN). The user 
identification is given by the card, and users have to provide the PIN code.  
Fraud occurs when other people gain access to the user id and to the password.  
 Digital signature: PKI 
A user digitally signing a message first needs a public / private key pair, given by a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Then the message signed with the private key is sent to 
the receiver. The receiver has to check both the signature and the public key of the 
sender. This can be done either by storing the previously authenticated public key of the 
user, or by going along a certification path. A certification authority signs the public key 
of the user. The signature of this certification authority has to be signed itself by a higher 
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certification authority, up to the root certification authority. Each of the signature 
verifications is computationally intensive, and going along the certification path incurs 
communication costs. There is a trade-off with administrative costs: it is possible to store 
all or part of the required public keys, so that it is not necessary to go up to the root 
certification authority. 
Fraud implies that one of the PKI signatures has to be broken, which is supposed to be 
impossible given the size of the keys. 
 Hash function 
There are other ways to authenticate a user. It is also possible perform an authentication 
with less computationally intensive tools, such as hash functions. Hash functions are used 
a lot by micropayment schemes. A hash function is a function that produces a number 
from a message in such a way that it is extremely unlikely that some other text will 
produce the same hash value. A hash function with good cryptographic qualities will 
make it very hard to generate two texts having the hash value. These functions are called 
one-way functions.  
The protocol used for authentication is very simple (Schneier, 1996, p.53). There is an 
initialization phase where the user exchanges results of a hash function with a server; 
subsequently, each time the user can provide the number whose result by the hash 
function is the same as the one stored on the server, she is authenticated. Each number 
used is crossed out and cannot be used anymore.  
This is very close to a userID – password scheme. The difference comes from the fact 
that passwords can be used one time only, and that the system has to be reinitialized once 
in a while.  
Fraud implies that the one-way hash function has been inverted or that the number has 
been stolen. 
 Attributes 
Table 4-1 lists the attributes of primitive authentication, and Table 4-2 lists the privacy 
properties. The design of Table 4-2 comes from the analysis of privacy in payment 
systems made in section 2.2.13. 
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Table 4-1: Attributes of primitive Authentication 
 Human 
authentication 
Biometrics UserID + 
Password  
PKI Hash 
function 
Computation None High None High Low 
User interface N/A Biometric 
device 
Screen + device 
to enter code 
None (device 
to access 
private key?) 
None 
Communication N/A None Low Medium Low 
Time Slow Medium Slow (enter 
userID and 
password) 
Medium Quick 
Fixed costs None High None High (if 
subscription 
to the PKI 
scheme) 
None 
Transaction cost Low / High, 
depending on 
the scheme 
(e.g. checks) 
Low Low Low Low 
Fraud risk Low Potentially 
none 
High Low Low 
Transaction 
Time 
Slow Medium Quick Medium Quick 
Non refutable N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Security N/A N/A Low, medium if 
communication 
link is encrypted 
High High 
Unobtrusive  N/A No Enter user ID and 
password 
Enter 
password 
Yes 
 
Table 4-2: Privacy characteristics of primitive Authentication 
WHAT THEY KNOW  
Party 
authenticating 
Party to 
authenticate 
Amount of 
transaction 
Time and 
place of 
transaction 
Nature of 
transaction 
Identifiable N/A Credentials Party 
authenticating Traceable N/A Credentials 
N/A Everything N/A 
Identifiable Nothing N/A Party to 
authenticate Traceable Nothing N/A 
N/A Everything N/A 
Issuer N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Bank 
Acquirer N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Central authority (if 
applicable) 
Some Depends N/A Time N/A W
H
O
 
K
N
O
W
S 
Observer Depends Depends N/A Time N/A 
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 Authorization 
 Definition 
Authorization is the right to access a system or a device, or the right to perform a 
particular operation. It usually involves credentials and some sort of authentication. For 
instance, MIT students may be authorize to access the MIT bursar account system. A 
customer may be authorized to withdraw cash from an ATM, provided that she has 
enough money on her account. 
Authentication and authorization may be different. Authorization often includes some 
type of authentication, but not necessarily. An example where we can have authorization 
but no authentication is a cash transaction: the bill or the electronic coin is checked (or 
authorized), but this is done without authenticating the payer. 
Authorization may be performed by a bank or by a user.  
Authorization could be passive: a user could authorize a system to perform transaction on 
her behalf if certain properties are verified (such as amount of transaction, context, etc).  
 Functional Diagram 
 
 
Authorization 
Type of 
operation to be 
authorized 
Authorized / 
not authorized 
 
Figure 4-2: Diagram of primitive Authorization 
Figure 4-2 shows the diagram of primitive Authorization. 
 Classes 
The attributes of the following classes are summarized in Table 4-3. 
 Human authorization  
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Authorization via the "real world" is an authorization made by phone, mail, email, fax, 
etc. A human being needs to personally authorize the transaction. For instance, in the 
First Virtual payment system, the user receives an email asking to confirm each 
transaction. In the real world, a bank customer may have to be physically present to 
authorize certain transactions (e.g. large money transfers), or send a fax, or just confirm 
the order by phone. Some systems are very simple, and just prompt users with an “ OK”  
dialog box to make sure they authorize the transaction.  
Human authorization incurs no computation, but requires communications. Fraud can 
occur if the communication link is tampered with. 
 Automatic authorization 
In this case, a machine is granted the right to confirm a transaction. The machine can 
check for example that there is enough money on the bank account, or that the credit card 
number is valid and is not on a blacklist, or that a token has not been spent yet.  
There are two types of automatic authorization: First, the party authorizing the transaction 
has all the information needed locally. This happens for instance in the case of the payer, 
if the device is granted the right to conduct automatically the transaction, or in the case of 
the payee, in the case of an off-line scheme such as real cash or CAFÉ, all the 
information needed are stored on the device. The other possibility is when the user has to 
go on-line to authorize the transaction. This happens in the case of DigiCash, for 
example, where the token has to be checked in a central database against double 
spending.  
Automatic authorization incurs some computation (compute the authorization), and 
communication (request and respond to the request). This system often uses a database. 
For instance, DigiCash authorize a payment by checking that the presented token has not 
been spent yet.  
Again, fraud can occur if the communication channel or the machine is tampered with. 
 Attributes 
Table 4-3 lists the attributes of primitive authentication.  
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Table 4-3: Attributes of primitive Authorization 
 Human authorization Automatic off-line 
authorization 
Automatic on-line 
authorization 
Computation None Some Some 
User interface Depends on the 
interface (phone, 
dialog box, etc) 
Screen + device to 
enter information 
Screen + device to 
enter information  
Communication N/A None Low 
Time Slow Fast Medium 
Fixed costs Depends on the 
implementation 
None High if central 
database 
Transaction cost Low, high if 
communication are 
expensive 
Low Medium because of 
communications 
Fraud risk Low Medium, easier to 
fraud 
Low 
Transaction 
Time 
Slow Quick Quick 
Non refutable Yes, depending on 
the implementation 
Yes, if a proof is 
given 
Yes, if a proof is 
given 
Security Depends on the 
implementation 
Depends on the 
implementation 
Depends on the 
implementation 
Unobtrusive No Yes Yes 
 
Privacy attributes: 
In the case of off-line systems, privacy is not exposed. All the processing is done locally, 
therefore there is no information leakage. In the case of on-line systems, usually a third 
party has to be consulted. The privacy characteristics depend highly on the information 
given to this third party, and therefore on the scheme used.  
For instance, for Digicash24, the server knows the amount of the transaction, and 
identifies the payee, but cannot learn anything on the payer. In a check-based system, the 
central authority learns the amount, the ID of the payer and the ID of the payee, in order 
to check that there is enough money on the payer’ s account and to authorize the payment. 
Thus, each implementation of the primitive Authorization will have different privacy 
attributes.  
                                                 
24
 DigiCash will be examined in detail in chapter 5. 
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 Transfer 
 Definition 
The transfer primitive takes care of any transfer of information between two parties that 
represents an actual transaction. It is formalized by a transaction object, described in 
section 4.3.1. 
Transfer of value is the transfer of something that has a value by itself, like a coin, a 
stream of bits representing an electronic token, a paper check, etc. It can be notational or 
token-based money.  
A transfer of data can be a transfer of information required to conduct the transaction. 
This can be credentials, personal information such as account number, etc. Transfers can 
be done over phone lines, Internet, hand-to-hand, etc. An important characteristic of 
transfers is whether they are encrypted or not. 
A transfer can be modeled as a "copy" or a "move" function. The difference between the 
transfer of value and the transfer of data is that a transfer of value is necessarily a "move" 
operation, and the transfer of data is a "copy" operation. In effect, when transferring 
something that has a value, the sender cannot keep it; otherwise the value of it would be 
doubled. Therefore, a transfer of value can be seen as a "move" operation of this object. 
On the other hand, when transferring data, the sender usually keeps the information and 
this operation is close to a "copy" operation. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4-3, there are two types of transfer primitives. The first one is 
transfer-out; the second is transfer-in. Transfer-out is responsible for sending the 
transaction object to the other party. An external operation builds a transaction object (see 
section 4.3.1), and gives it to the transfer-out primitive, which sends it to the other party. 
Transfer-in receives the information, formats it into a transaction object, and triggers 
another operation by passing the transaction object.  
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 Functional diagram 
 
 
Transfer - out 
("move" or "copy" operation) 
External Action out in 
Transaction 
object 
 
Transfer - in 
External Action 
in 
Triggers another operation,  
passes a Transaction object 
 
Figure 4-3: Diagram of primitive Transfer, differentiated as “Transfer-out” and “Transfer-in” 
Figure 4-3 shows the diagram of primitive Transfer. The transaction object is defined in 
section 4.3.1 on primitive objects.  
 Classes 
The attributes of the following classes are summarized in Table 4-4. 
 Physical transfers: hand to hand 
This occurs for example when paying with real cash or when giving a check to someone. 
This method is not used on-line and cannot be implemented. It may be used for 
initialization for instance.  
 Physical transfers: mail 
This happens when sending something by mail, or for instance when a bank needs to send 
a check that was deposited to the issuing bank for authentication. 
This method incurs high communication costs. Fraud occurs if the mail is intercepted. 
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As in the case of hand-to-hand transfer, this method cannot be used on-line and cannot be 
implemented.  
 One-way electronic transfers 
In this case, the transfer is made over a network, which can be the Internet for instance. 
This is the only method used to conduct on-line transactions. There are many ways to 
implement this; the main characteristic is whether it is encrypted or not. Fraud occurs if 
the bit stream is intercepted or modified. 
Transfers can be one-way or two-way.  
One-way transfers are transfers where the receiver does not have to respond to the sender. 
This is the case of emails for instance. This does not require a direct network connection, 
and this system is often used asynchronously, meaning that the receiver and the sender do 
not have to interact synchronously. PayPal works on this mode: when the payer initiates a 
payment, the payee receives an email and can claim the money on PayPal server later. 
Two-way transfers are made on a two-way direct network connection to interact. The 
sender and the receiver are in a synchronous transfer mode. The receiver will take 
immediate action to respond to the sender’ s message.  
 Attributes 
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Table 4-4: Attributes of primitive Transfer 
 Hand to hand 
transfer 
Mail transfer Electronic transfer 
Computation None None Low 
User interface N/A N/A N/A 
Communication N/A High Depends on the 
context (e.g. 
mobile vs. DSL) 
Time Medium Slow (a few days) Quick, depends on 
the link 
Fixed costs None None High (subscription 
to the provider) 
Transaction 
cost 
N/A High Depends on the 
context (flat rate 
vs. per bit rate) 
Fraud risk None High (interception) Low if encrypted 
Transaction 
Time 
Medium Slow Quick 
Non refutable N/A No, except if 
certified with receipt 
Depends on the 
implementation 
Security N/A Low (interception) High if encrypted 
Unobtrusive N/A Send a letter via Post 
Office 
Yes 
 
The privacy attribute of Transfer is highly dependent on the scheme and the 
implementation; it cannot be generalized. In some cases, transfer could certainly worsen 
the traceability characteristics of the transaction: for instance, a transfer could leak an IP 
address. In some others, transfer would not have any consequence on privacy.  
 Record keeping 
 Definition 
Different parties in the payment system may have the will or the obligation to keep 
records of transactions. This may come from and also be limited by legal requirements. 
This is the part where privacy and security interact the most.  
The most interesting fact about a record keeping operation is what triggered the 
operation. Record keeping is highly dependant on other operations. In fact, it is either 
triggered by an action of wrapped around other actions. The different characteristics, 
Payment systems for the Personal Router 
 - 105 - 
which depend on the payment scheme, are whether it is triggered before or after another 
operation, whether it records the input, the output, or both of other operations, whether 
the record is public and whether it keeps track of identities (privacy issues). 
The record keeping operation can also have a result, and can trigger another operation in 
result. For instance, a record keeping operation could be in charge of detecting fraud 
patterns. This role can be modeled by a record keeping operation running permanently, 
and take advantage of the offline or idle time of the machine to perform different analyses 
of the record.  
Another important distinction is the difference between what has to be recorded for the 
good conduct of the transaction, what has to be recorded for law enforcement reasons, 
and what parties wish to record for their own use.  
 Functional diagram 
Figure 4-4 shows the diagram of primitive Record Keeping. 
 
Record Keeping 
operation Record access 
External operation in 
Trigger
+ data 
Optional feedback 
 
Figure 4-4: Diagram of primitive Record keeping 
 Classes 
The attributes of the following classes are summarized in Table 4-5. 
 Local computer database 
Records are stored locally in a database. This requires some computation (database 
queries, maintain the database), Fraud occurs if entries are added, deleted or modified, 
and this should not be possible, as the database is stored locally. 
 Distant computer database 
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Records are stored on a distant server. In this case, if the user wants to access records on 
the server, she has to trust that she will always have access to it, and that records will not 
be modified or deleted. The advantage of this method is that the tasks of maintaining and 
querying the database are left to the distant server. Whenever a user needs information, 
she has to access the server and make a query. This requires communications.  
 Attributes 
Table 4-5: Attributes of primitive Record Keeping 
 Local database Distant database 
Computation Low Low 
User interface N/A N/A 
Communication N/A Depends on the context  
Time Quick Medium 
Fixed costs None High (subscription to the 
provider) 
Transaction 
cost 
None Depends on the context 
(flat rate vs. per bit rate) 
Fraud risk None Low if encrypted 
Transaction 
Time 
Quick Slow 
Non refutable N/A Depends on the 
implementation 
Security N/A High if encrypted 
Unobtrusive Yes Yes 
 
Storing data locally do not modify the privacy attributes of a scheme. However, using a 
distant server do. The information leakage comes from two sources. The first one is 
during the actual transaction, when data about the current transaction is stored. The party 
maintaining this database has access to the information. The second one is when parties 
make subsequent queries on the database. The party maintaining the database can learn 
information about users connecting to the database, how often they connect, what 
information they are looking for, maybe from where they access the database.  
The information leakage is dependant on the scheme, because different schemes leak 
different types of information. 
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 Aggregation 
 Definition 
This is the action of grouping several operations together. It is usually done to make a 
single big transfer instead of many small value transfers. It is typically temporally 
decoupled from the transaction itself, and mainly occurs between two financial 
institutions. For instance, in the credit card system, transactions are aggregated and 
settled regularly between banks. The time between settlements depends on parameters 
fixed by the parties. It could be for instance once a day, once a month, as soon as a fixed 
amount is exceeded. 
Aggregation is also used by micropayments schemes to reduce costs.  
In many cases, aggregation can be modeled with a record keeping operation.  
There are different types of aggregators: 
- Forward aggregators: in the case of payments, the actual transfers of 
money are made before the paying operation (e.g. pre-paid cards) 
- Backward aggregators: in the case of payments, the actual transfers of 
money are made after the paying operation (e.g. phone monthly bill) 
- Discount aggregators: the more you buy, the cheaper it is 
- Averaging aggregators: average a large number of operation and keep only 
the mean 
- Flat rate aggregator: pay a monthly fee for unlimited access 
Aggregation gets transaction objects as an input. When it is triggered (typically by 
another primitive such as timing), it gives an output that can trigger other actions.  
 Functional diagram 
Figure 4-5 shows the diagram of primitive Aggregation. 
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Transaction 
objects out 
Trigger 
Aggregation 
 
Figure 4-5: Diagram of primitive Aggregation 
 Attributes 
The attributes of this primitive are highly dependant on the scheme and on the 
implementation.  
The privacy attributes of aggregation are nonetheless very interesting, as aggregation can 
actually improve privacy performances of the scheme.  
In fact, aggregation allows hiding specific information in the aggregated data. For 
instance, instead of recording when a communication was made, from where, and what 
sites were visited, it is much better, from a privacy perspective, to add the price of the 
communication to a monthly bill.  
 Timing  
 Definition 
Transactions may take a certain delay to process, or may accept a delay. For instance, a 
check will usually be voided if deposited more than one year after it was written. For cash 
transactions, withdrawing or depositing cash is temporally decoupled from the transaction 
itself. Check and account transfer transactions may take a certain time to settle, 
sometimes up to a few days.  
This time component of a transaction can be separated in two: timing and delay.  
The delay comes from the time required by primitives to complete their tasks. They can 
be included in the primitives themselves.  
However, timing primitive is necessary when something has to be used or made before a 
certain time (e.g. "do by… " or "use by..."). For instance, a check has to be deposited 
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before a certain date before being void, and an e-cash coin must be spent or redeemed 
before a certain date before being void.  
The delay primitive is easy to implement in other primitives. A timing operation is more 
difficult to simulate in the case where it triggers another operation.  
 Functional diagram 
Figure 4-6 shows the diagram of primitive Timing. 
 
 
Timing 
Action 
External Action out in 
Trigger
+ data 
Triggers another 
action  
 
Figure 4-6: Diagram of primitive Timing 
 Electronic cash transaction 
The delay allowed between the e-cash withdrawal and the actual payment has a cost. As 
all token numbers must be recorded to prevent double spending, the longer the delay, the 
bigger the database, and the more expensive it is. This cost can be limited by having an 
expiry date on transactions. 
4.4 Selection process 
The selection process would be very similar to the one proposed in (MacKie-Mason and 
White, 1997). It should handle first the binary constraints, and eliminate all potential 
solutions that do not satisfy these constraints. Then the process should deal with fuzzier 
constraints and try to optimize the solution to find the best implementation given all the 
constraints. 
The process would be able to select the payment scheme satisfying the greater number of 
the most important preferences ranked by the user.  
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4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have first described different transaction models in the context of the 
Personal Router. These models help understand the spectrum of possible exchange 
models that the Personal Router will need to implement.  
To help manage the requirements of users and match them with the necessity of a 
payment system, a decomposition of payment schemes in primitive operations is 
proposed. Each of these primitive represents a particular operation of a payment system, 
and the combination of these operations acts as the real payment system. There are 
different ways to implement those primitives, while keeping the same results. With this 
framework, it is therefore possible to modify the properties of a payment system by 
changing an implementation of a primitive. 
Properties of these primitives are defined and called attributes, and users’  preferences are 
identified through these attributes.  
 
Matching users’  preferences with a specific payment system means selecting the payment 
system that is the closer to the set of preferences previously defined.  
 
In the next chapter, we will give several examples of payment systems decompositions 
into primitives, and some possible modifications of these schemes. 
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5 RESULTS / EXAMPLES 
To demonstrate possible applications of the framework of primitives defined in chapter 4, 
this chapter shows how three real payment systems can be constructed from them. These 
three payment systems have been selected because they cover very different areas of the 
rich environment of payment systems, and they are likely to be used in the Personal 
Router. Each of these is first decomposed and several suggestions of implementations are 
given, with the modifications induced.  
The three payment systems are DigiCash, credit cards and PayPal. DigiCash and PayPal 
are symmetric, in the sense that a payer can also be a payee and vice versa. However, 
credit card systems require payees to be registered as merchant before being able to 
accept credit card payments.  
DigiCash is an electronic cash system, providing total anonymity to the payer. It is 
interesting to consider because of it is fully anonymous. The Personal Router 
environment is likely to value this property.  
The second system chosen is the credit card system. This is one of the most used on the 
Internet and in the “ real”  world. Its pervasive presence in payments makes it very 
important. It is likely to be used a lot in the Personal Router system.  
The last payment system examined in this chapter is PayPal, which is one of the few 
successful payment systems specifically designed for the Internet. It has more than 15 
million subscribers and represents a growing part of peer-to-peer Internet transactions. 
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These characteristics also make PayPal a potentially very successful payment system in 
the Personal Router environment. 
From these examples, it will be possible to conclude about the weaknesses and the 
advantages of the construction of primitives.  
5.1 DigiCash 
DigiCash25 was one of the first companies to launch an electronic cash payment scheme. 
This company was founded by David Chaum. The main characteristic of this scheme is 
that it is fully anonymous. The client withdraws coins from the bank in such a way that 
the bank is unable to find out the serial numbers of those coins. The coins can then be 
spent anonymously with a merchant, who cannot learn anything from them except that 
they are valid. Double-spending is prevented by having payee redeem coins to the bank 
and getting the bank’ s authorization before completing the transaction. Even collusion 
between the bank and a merchant cannot reveal any information about the user.  
5.1.1 Quick technical overview of DigiCash 
A precise description of the DigiCash scheme and of its details can be found in 
(O’ Mahony et al., 2001), in (Camp, 2000), and in (Schneier, 1996). DigiCash uses 
blinding techniques to hide the coin’ s serial number from the bank when the bank signs a 
new coin. To withdraw a coin, users first choose a random number, which will be the 
serial numbers of the coin. This number is large enough so that it is extremely unlikely 
that two users choose the same serial number. The serial number is cryptographically 
signed by the bank, using blinding techniques that prevent the bank to see the serial 
number (see (Schneier, 1996) for more details on blinding). The bank uses a different 
signature key for each coin denomination. Coin denominations are chosen so that any 
amount can be paid with these coins (for instance, denominations can be chosen as the 
successive powers of two). This allows payments of any dollar amount with a 
combination of coins. The client then unblinds the coins, and stores them into a “ wallet.”   
When a coin is spent, the merchant redeems the coins to the bank, and the bank checks by 
looking for the coins’  serial numbers in a central database that they have not been already 
                                                 
25
 http://www.digicash.com  
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spent. If not, the bank sends back an acknowledgement and credits the merchant’ s 
account. Hash values of a secret created by the client is cryptographically associated with 
the coins to provide the client with the possibility to later prove that she initiated the 
payment. Figure 5-1 represents a complete transaction with the DigiCash scheme. 
 
sdfsdf 
PAYER PAYEE 
E-CASH BANK 
maintains a database of spent coins against double-spending 
3. request goods, send coins 
6. send goods 
4. deposit coins 
1. send blinded 
coins to bank 
for signature 
2. send signed 
coins, debit 
payer’ s account 
5. confirm 
payment,  
credit payee’ s 
account 
Temporally 
decoupled 
Steps 1 and 2 can be temporally decoupled from the other steps 
 
Figure 5-1: The DigiCash scheme 
The bank’ s database must store all the serial numbers and secrets of spent coins; thus, it 
grows very quickly. To prevent this database from being too large and unmanageable, an 
expiry date is associated to every signature of a denomination. Before a signature expires, 
clients must redeem all coins with the corresponding signature to the bank and withdraw 
new ones.  
A coin is therefore valid if it was signed with the signature associated with the correct 
denomination, if the current date is before the expiry date of the signature key, and if the 
serial number of the coin does not appear in the database.  
5.1.2 Primitives of a DigiCash payment system 
In this section, we will go over the different parties in a DigiCash system and describe the 
primitives and their attributes. The system is supposed to be already initialized; this 
means that the payer and the payee both have a DigiCash account and that the payer has 
already withdrawn valid coins from the bank.  
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Figure 5-2 shows how DigiCash is broken into primitive operations during a transaction 
between a payer and a payee. Figure 5-2 does not include the initial withdrawal of 
money. 
sdfsdf 
PAYER’ s PR 
Record Keeping 
PAYEE’ s PR 
Record Keeping 
E-CASH BANK 
Maintains a database of spent coins against double-spending 
Request goods, send coins 
 
Transfer primitive 
 
Deposit coins, wait for bank’ s 
response 
Authorization primitive 
Deposit expiring coins 
Timing primitive 
 
Figure 5-2: The DigiCash primitives 
The following sections will describe primitives for the payer and for the payee. Section 
5.1.3 will show several possible modifications of these primitives. 
 On the payer’s side 
We assume here the function of the payer. The initialization phase consists first in having 
an account set up with the bank minting coins, and second in withdrawing coins from the 
bank. The first phase will often involve human interactions, while the second phase can 
be done automatically. The second part of initialization could be designed with the 
primitives, as shown in Figure 5-3. We will first go over the withdrawal of coins, and 
then examine the transaction between the payer and the payee.  
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 Initialization phase: withdrawal of coins 
 
PAYER’ s PR 
record keeping 
of coins 
E-CASH 
BANK 
1. Authentication 
2. Two-way Transfer 
1. Payer sends blinded coins to bank 
2. Bank sends signed blinded coins 
3. 3. Payer unblinds coins 
 
Figure 5-3: Withdrawal of coins in DigiCash with primitives 
Figure 5-3 shows how the withdrawal of coins could be done with primitive. First, users 
would need to authenticate themselves to the bank. Then they would prepare blinded 
coins and send them to the bank for signature. The bank would return them signed, and 
payers would unblind the coins to obtain valid coins that they can spend later. 
It uses three primitives: authentication, transfer and record keeping. Authentication could 
be any kind of authentication supported by both parties. Transfer is a two-way transfer, 
and needs to perform some cryptographic operations leading to higher computational 
needs. Record keeping involves keeping track of created coins and spent coins. It is done 
locally by the payer, because the bank does not know the serial numbers of issued coins. 
Other primitives are not involved. 
 Description of the primitives 
In this section, we will only consider the actual transaction between a payer and a payee 
where value is transferred. The payer is assumed to have already withdrawn coins from 
the bank, and is ready to pay the payee.  
There is no authentication by the payer. However, when the payer needs to withdraw 
coins from the bank, authentication is required. There is no authorization either: in effect, 
the burden of authorizing the payment is on the payee, who must check coins against 
double spending.  
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The transfer primitive is in charge of sending the coins to the payee. It is a one way 
electronic transfer. Coins are encrypted with the bank’ s public key to prevent them being 
stolen in transit and to prevent the merchant to tamper with them. Additional secret 
information is added to provide the user with the ability to later prove that she did the 
payment in the case of a dispute (see (O’ Mahony et al., 2001, pp. 172-186) for more 
information). Therefore, the transfer primitive is fairly complex and requires several 
computations of signatures and hash functions.  
The record keeping primitive keeps a record of the coins sent (their serial number and 
their secret information) and of the payees they were given to. This allows the payer to 
prove later that she spent the coins and what she spent them for in case of a dispute. 
There is no aggregation. 
The timing primitive is in charge of redeeming coins to the bank before they expire and 
withdrawing new coins. It is not used during a particular transaction, but it is needed as a 
part of the client implementation. 
 Analysis of the attributes of the primitives 
Table 5-1 lists the primitives involved in the client implementation.  
Table 5-1: Primitives’ attributes of a DigiCash payer 
 Transfer: one 
way electronic 
transfer 
Record 
keeping: local 
database 
Timing Result of 
combination 
Computation High Low High High 
User interface N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Communication Low None Low Low 
Time Quick, depends 
on the link 
Quick Quick Quick 
Fixed costs None None None None 
Transaction 
cost 
Low Low Low Low 
Fraud risk Low  None Low Low 
Transaction 
Time 
Quick Quick Quick Quick 
Non refutable Yes N/A N/A Yes 
Security High  N/A High High 
Unobtrusive Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Privacy analysis 
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On the client’ s side, due to the perfect anonymity provided by electronic cash systems, all 
primitive are anonymous and there is no information leakage. 
 On the payee’s side 
We assume here the function of the payee. The payee is supposed to have already an 
account at the bank, and is ready to receive a payment from the payer. The payee must 
have completed a phase of registration that is not described here and that could require 
physical interaction as in the case of the payer. 
 Description of the primitives 
There is no authentication. DigiCash does not require the payer to be authenticated; the 
payer remains anonymous. However, the payee may have to authenticate herself when 
depositing the coins at the bank. This is done by signing the payment made by the payer 
and encrypting the message with the bank’ s public key. This can be considered as part of 
the Authorization primitive.  
Authorization: The payee has to authorize the payment by forwarding the coins to the 
bank. If the coins are valid, the bank returns the result to the payee, credit the payee’ s 
account, and the payment is authorized.  
The transfer primitive is in charge of receiving coins from the payer. It is a one way 
electronic transfer. Coins are prepared by the payer and do not require additional 
processing by the payee before being passed to the authorization primitive.  
The record keeping primitive keeps a record of the coins received and authorized. 
There is no aggregation. 
There is no timing primitive. 
 Analysis of the attributes of the primitives 
Table 5-2 lists the primitives involved in the payee implementation.  
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Table 5-2: Primitives’ attributes of a DigiCash payee 
 Authorization Transfer: one 
way electronic 
transfer 
Record 
keeping: local 
database 
Result of 
combination 
Computation High Low Low High 
User interface N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Communication High Low None High 
Time Quick, depends 
on the response 
from the bank 
Quick, depends 
on the link 
Quick Quick 
Fixed costs None None None None 
Transaction 
cost 
Low (fee from 
the bank?) 
Low Low Low 
Fraud risk Low Low  None Low 
Transaction 
Time 
Quick Quick Quick Quick 
Non refutable Yes Yes N/A Yes 
Security High High N/A High 
Unobtrusive Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 Privacy analysis 
On the payer’ s side, the only piece of information released is the merchant ID and a 
description of the order. This information cannot be accessed by the bank, because it is 
hashed before being released to the bank. The aim of this point of detail is to provide 
dispute resolution: in case of a dispute, the payer can prove to the bank what was ordered, 
because the hash value of the order’ s description will match what was earlier sent to the 
bank. 
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The privacy properties are summarized in Table 5-3. Information released because of the 
transfer primitive is in italics, information released because of the authorization primitive 
is not. The record keeping primitive does not need to release any information to the 
outside world. 
Table 5-3: Privacy characteristics of a DigiCash transaction 
WHAT THEY KNOW  
Identity of 
buyer 
Identity of 
seller 
Amount of 
transaction 
Time and place 
of transaction 
Nature of 
transaction 
Identifiable N/A Merchant ID Buyer 
Traceable N/A Nothing 
Everything Everything Everything 
Identifiable Nothing  N/A Seller 
Traceable Nothing N/A 
Everything Everything Everything 
Issuer Nothing Nothing Nothing Nothing Nothing Bank 
Acquirer Payer’ s bank Merchant ID Amount Time if on-line Nothing W
H
O
 
K
N
O
W
S 
Observer Nothing Nothing Nothing Time Partial 
 
5.1.3 Examples of modifications of these primitives 
In this section, modifications of the primitives described at the previous section are 
proposed. These modifications will slightly modify the behavior of the primitives, thus 
modify the behavior of the local implementation of the scheme on the payer’ s side or on 
the payee’ s side. 
 Privacy of the payer 
DigiCash provides a perfect anonymity to the payer. However, the payer may prefer for 
diverse reasons to be not anonymous. For instance, users could get cheaper prices or 
additional services if they release the name. Another case could be that the merchant 
wishes to ensure the user’ s identity for a specific reason, such as verifying the right to 
access some information. Although anonymity is preferred in most cases, it can be that it 
is an undesirable property. In this case, the transfer primitive could be modified so that it 
sends some identity along with the payment. This identification can be partial, like a 
pseudonym, a birth date, an address, last name, or any other information. The DigiCash 
system would then be selected only for other reasons because it is preferred by one or 
more of the parties, and its privacy properties can be changed to fit the wishes of users.  
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 Authorization by the payee 
Depositing coins to the bank has a cost. The bank may charge a fee per coin, and the 
communication and computation involved have a cost. If the payee wants to reduce 
marginal costs relative to a payment (in particular in the case of a payment of small 
value), she could decide to deposit coins later when for instance the communication is 
cheaper, and trust the payer to give valid coins. Another strategy would be to use a 
probabilistic approach, and to check randomly whether the coins are valid or not 
randomly. The risk associated with these strategies could be cheaper than the cost of 
checking the coins right away.  
The authorization primitive could implement those different strategies and use one or the 
other depending on the context. The choice of an implementation could modify the 
attributes of the payment system for the payee. 
5.1.4 Summary 
 Attributes of DigiCash 
Table 5-4: Primitives’ attributes of a DigiCash payer 
 Transfer: one 
way electronic 
transfer 
Record 
keeping: local 
database 
Timing Result of 
combination 
Computation High Low High High 
User interface N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Communication Low None Low Low 
Time Quick, depends 
on the link 
Quick Quick Quick 
Fixed costs None None None None 
Transaction 
cost 
Low Low Low Low 
Fraud risk Low  None Low Low 
Transaction 
Time 
Quick Quick Quick Quick 
Non refutable Yes N/A N/A Yes 
Security High  N/A High High 
Unobtrusive Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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The analysis is summarized in Table 5-4. Therefore, a DigiCash transaction is quick, 
requires a fair amount of computation and provides good security features. The privacy 
characteristics are very good, as this scheme provides full anonymity to the payer. 
DigiCash is an important system in the world of electronic payments, because it is one of 
the first fully anonymous payment systems. The primitive approach enables 
modifications of the behavior of the system. Two examples of modification have been 
studied: privacy and authorization. Privacy modifications are done when total anonymity 
is not desired, and authorization permits off-line transactions and cheaper fees in 
exchange for higher risks. 
This decomposition is working with DigiCash, but do not provide a lot of customization. 
This is due to the fact that interfaces between players cannot be changed. Therefore, the 
system built with primitive allows only a small number of modifications. Nevertheless, 
this framework manages to offer several options to the payer and the payee, and these 
options are easy to implement and to modify. 
5.2 Credit Cards 
Detailed information about credit cards systems can be found in (O’ Mahony et al., 2001), 
in (Camp, 1999).  
5.2.1 Description of the scheme 
Credit cards have been introduced a few decades ago.  
There are two main distinct types of credit cards, which tend to overlap a lot: 
• Credit cards: payments are set against a special-purpose bank account of the user, 
with an interest rate on unpaid balances. 
• Debit cards: they are directly linked to a checking account, and work almost 
exactly as checks. In particular, payments can be made only if there is enough 
money to meet the amount of the transactions. 
 
Both systems have a spending limit set by the user, the bank or the card issuer. 
One major drawback of the credit card system is that the information needed to conduct 
an online transaction is the credit card number, the expiration date and the name of the 
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cardholder. This information can be easily stolen, especially online, and this increases 
fraud costs. When doing an online transaction, the payer does not have to be present and 
to present physically the credit card, thus making fraudulent action easier. Fraud costs 
represent a large part of the transaction costs, which is fairly high compared to other 
payment systems. In this section, we will only consider online credit card transactions.  
This is why there have been many approaches aimed at reducing fraud costs, which 
would result in a reduced transaction costs and in an increased profitability of the system.  
• Secure Socket Layer: this general-purpose cryptographic protocol is implemented 
on most browsers, and provides a way to securely exchange information between 
a client and a server. Using SSL is an easy way to protect sensitive 
communications (such as credit card numbers) on the Internet. 
• SET26 (Secure Electronic Transactions) is a major effort led by MasterCard and 
Visa, the two major credit card companies, along with other important players in 
the field of payment systems such as Microsoft and IBM. It provides a secure 
framework for paying online with a credit card. Due to its complexity, SET has 
not been deployed beyond trials, and simplified versions of this scheme are under 
research. 
• In Europe, all credit cards27 are equipped since 1992 with a chip performing 
different cryptographic operations. These smart cards are much more difficult to 
counterfeit than common magnetic cards. In addition, it would be very easy to 
authenticate the credit card owner with a smart card reader connected to the 
computer. However, although it greatly improves the security features of real-
world transactions, it does not change anything for on-line payments until card 
readers are widely deployed. 
• Another example of improvement of credit card security is the one time credit 
card, developed in particular by American Express. When an Internet purchase is 
to be made, the payer’ s application requests a credit card number from the card 
issuer. The generated number has a fixed validity period and can be used only 
once: after the transaction, the card issuer will mark the card number as invalid. 
                                                 
26
 http://www.setco.org/  
27
 http://www.cartes-bancaires.com/GB/Pages/Accueil2.htm  
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Merchants (and potential observers) cannot see the difference between one of 
these one-time numbers and regular credit card numbers. The rest of the 
transaction is normal. 
 Credit card transaction 
 
BUYER SELLER 
Issuing 
Bank 
Acquiring 
Bank 
Credit card 
company’s private 
network 
1. Send credit card information 
2a. Authorization 
request 
3. unsynchronized 
Billing 
2c. Authorization 2b. Authorization 
3. unsynchronized settlement less 
transfer fee (1.5 to 2.5%) 
3. 
unsynchronized 
credit of seller’ s 
account, less 
transaction fee 
 
Figure 5-4: The credit card scheme 
Figure 5-4 shows the complexity of a credit card transaction and the multiple parties 
involved. Banks that belong to the credit card association may act as card issuers to their 
clients who wish to have a credit card, and as acquirers to their clients who wish to accept 
credit cards. When the buyer pays the seller, she transmits the card’ s details. The seller 
forward this information along with the amount of the transaction to the acquiring bank, 
which deals with the credit card association’ s network and credits the merchant’ s account 
if the transaction is authorized. A fee is deducted from the amount paid to the payee.  
If the issuing bank and the acquiring bank are the same, the credit card network does not 
charge anything for the transaction. 
Credit card transactions are very close to check transactions. However, there are two 
important differences. The first is that all transactions go through the private network of 
the credit card company, which links all banks together. The second difference is that the 
payer does not order a fund transfer or write a check; the payer actually gives all 
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information that the seller needs to conduct the transaction, and the seller makes the 
payment himself. 
The latter difference tends to fade. For example, SET (Secure Electronic Transactions), 
which is an evolution of the credit card system proposed by Visa and MasterCard, 
requires certificates and electronic signatures, and may be closer to on-line check-based 
systems than to credit card systems. 
5.2.2 Primitives of an online credit card transaction 
In this section, the different primitives used on the payer’ s side and on the merchant’ s 
side are described. Only the payer and the merchant are considered here. We assume that 
the payer has a valid credit card and is ready to pay the merchant. The merchant has a 
valid merchant account and can accept credit card payments. The initialization phase is 
not considered here, as it is a one-time operation requiring complex interactions between 
users and banks. 
The same kinds of primitives are used on both sides, therefore they will be examined 
together and the difference will be pointed out in each case. In addition, for each 
primitive studied, several examples of implementations are shown, and their attributes are 
presented. 
 
PAYER’s 
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Figure 5-5: Primitives in the credit card scheme 
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Figure 5-5 shows the place of primitives in a credit card transaction between a payer and 
a merchant. The dotted box represents the network of banks external to the payer and the 
payee.  
 Authentication 
Depending on the context, authentication may be performed via a Personal Identification 
Number, a handwritten signature, or may not exist. We will consider online payments 
only. Three ways of conducting this authentication are presented:  
• Authentication with a PIN: before using the card, the user has to enter a PIN code. 
The user could also have the PIN code memorized in the Personal Router, or use 
authenticating devices like a signet ring for example. 
• Authentication with biometrics: users need a biometric authenticating device, and 
authenticate themselves when needed. 
• No authentication; this is the current situation on the Internet. No authentication is 
necessary before the card details are sent to the merchant. 
 
Table 5-5 compares the different possible implementations of primitive Authentication. 
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Table 5-5: Attributes of primitive Authentication 
 Authentication 
with PIN code 
Authentication 
with biometrics 
Authentication by 
credit card number 
Computation Low High None 
User interface Keyboard or any 
device used to 
enter a PIN 
Biometrics 
reader 
None 
Communication None None None 
Time Quick Quick Quick 
Fixed costs None / low High None 
Transaction 
cost 
N/A N/A N/A 
Fraud risk Low  Low High 
Transaction 
Time 
Medium Medium Quick 
Non refutable N/A N/A N/A 
Security Medium High Low 
Unobtrusive No (enter PIN) No (biometrics) No (enter name and 
card number) 
 
In terms of privacy, those three implementations are taking place exclusively locally on 
the payer’ s computer. Only the output of the operation may be sent out to the merchant 
and the bank. Therefore, no information is released to any other party. 
On the merchant side, Authentication is used only when the merchant logs on the credit 
card network. 
 Authorization 
Authorization is done exclusively by the merchant. This corresponds to the operation 2 on 
Figure 5-4. The client does not need to perform this operation. Authorization occurs when 
the merchant receives the details of the payer and submits them to the credit card 
network. The merchant receives then a response, indicating whether the payment is 
authorized.  
Authorization can be performed in different ways. The merchant can trust the user, store 
the credit cards details and conduct the authorization procedure later, when the merchant 
sends batched transactions to the acquiring bank. The authorization is off-line in this 
case. The merchant could also check that the transaction is valid on-line before 
completing the transaction. Off-line authorization may be cheaper than on-line 
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authorization, and may be preferred in the case of small value payments. In this case, a 
floor limit may be set, where any transaction exceeding this limit requires an on-line 
authorization. 
 
Table 5-6: Attributes of primitive Authorization 
 On-line 
authorization 
Off-line 
authorization 
Computation Low Low 
User interface N/A N/A 
Communication Low None (occurs 
later) 
Time Medium Quick 
Fixed costs High Low 
Transaction 
cost 
Medium Low 
Fraud risk Low  High 
Transaction 
Time 
Medium Quick 
Non refutable Yes No 
Security High Low 
Unobtrusive Yes Yes 
 
This primitive does not influence privacy, except that the time of the transaction cannot 
be known precisely by other parties than the payer and the merchant if the authorization 
is off-line. 
 Transfer 
Transfer transfers from the payer to the payee the data necessary to conduct the credit 
card transaction; only a one-way transfer is necessary. This information is usually the 
card number, the expiration date, and the name of the cardholder. This data is critical, and 
must be protected as much as possible against fraudulent action. It is a one-way transfer.  
Two types of transfer could be used: encrypted transfer or not encrypted transfer. Today, 
transfers of credit card numbers are almost always encrypted, mostly using SSL. This is a 
simple protection and the additional costs of encryption are much lower than the risks of 
transferring a credit card number in the clear. 
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Another possible implementation of the transfer primitive would be to use a one-time 
credit card number system (such as the system proposed by American Express28) if this 
service is available. It requires only a modification of the payer’ s client, but it is invisible 
for the merchant. 
Table 5-7 lists the primitives involved in the client implementation.  
Table 5-7: Attributes of primitive Transfer 
 Non-encrypted 
Transfer 
Encrypted 
Transfer 
One time credit card 
number 
Computation Low Medium High 
User interface N/A N/A N/A 
Communication Low Medium High 
Time Quick Quick Medium, depends on 
server response’ s 
time 
Fixed costs None None None 
Transaction cost Low Low Low 
Fraud risk Very high Low Low 
Transaction Time Quick Quick Quick 
Non refutable N/A N/A N/A 
Security Low Medium High 
Unobtrusive Yes Yes Yes 
 
 Privacy 
Table 5-8 analyzes the privacy characteristics of the transfer primitive in the first two 
cases.  
                                                 
28
 http://www.americanexpress.com/  
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Table 5-8: Privacy characteristics if transfer is encrypted or not encrypted 
WHAT THEY KNOW  
Identity of buyer Identity of 
seller 
Amount of 
transaction 
Time and 
place of 
transaction 
Nature of 
transaction 
Identifiable N/A Merchant ID Buyer 
Traceable N/A Merchant ID 
Everything Everything Everything 
Identifiable Name/credit card 
number 
N/A 
Seller 
Traceable Name/credit card 
number 
N/A 
Everything Everything Everything 
Issuer Everything Everything Amount Time Nothing 
Bank Acquirer Name/credit card 
number 
Everything Amount Time Nothing 
Central authority Name/credit card 
number 
Everything Amount Time Nothing W
H
O
 
K
N
O
W
S 
Observer 
Nothing if 
encrypted, 
Name/credit card 
number if not 
Merchant ID Nothing if 
encrypted, 
Amount if 
not 
Time Partial 
 
If the transfer primitive is using the one-time credit card system, then the privacy analysis 
looks the same, except that the credit card number that is revealed loses any interest after 
the transaction. In effect, as this number can only be used once, they lose all value after 
the first use. 
 Record Keeping 
Record keeping is done for every transaction the user makes. This primitive is in charge 
of storing the details of the transaction, such as amount, date, merchant’ s ID. It is 
particularly important in credit card systems due to the relatively high fraud risks and of 
the generally high payment values.  
Record keeping can be done either by the credit card holder locally, or the credit card 
company can be trusted to do it for the user. It is also possible to use both systems and 
compare the results to detect an error or a fraud. 
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Table 5-9: Attributes of Record Keeping 
 Local database Distant database 
Computation Low Low 
User interface N/A N/A 
Communication None Medium 
Time Quick Medium 
Fixed costs None High (subscription to the 
provider) 
Transaction 
cost 
None Low 
Fraud risk None Low if encrypted 
Transaction 
Time 
Quick Quick 
Non refutable N/A N/A 
Security N/A High if encrypted 
Unobtrusive Yes Yes 
 
This primitive has little impact on privacy, because the credit card network keeps record 
of transaction systematically. Therefore, the only additional information released when 
the user is using a distant database is what information is she interested in and how often 
she checks this information, which is of little interest. Nevertheless, a distant database 
could be hacked and personal information could then be in wrong hands. The database 
must be very protected in order to prevent anybody to access the private data held. 
 Aggregation 
There is no aggregation in a credit card system at the level of the payer. If the 
authorization is off-line, the merchant will submit a lot of transactions at the same time, 
but each transaction will be separated from the other and will not be really aggregated. 
 Timing 
Timing is not involved in credit card systems, except when the expiration date is reached.  
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5.2.3 Summary 
 Attributes of credit card systems 
Table 5-10 summarizes the attributes of the most common implementations of each 
primitive. Table 5-11 presents the attributes of the merchant. Table 5-12 lists the privacy 
characteristics of the credit card system. 
Table 5-10: Attributes of a credit card transaction for the payer 
 Authentication by 
credit card number 
Encrypted 
Transfer 
Distant database Result of 
combination 
Computation None Medium Low Medium 
User interface None N/A N/A None 
Communication None Medium Low Medium 
Time Quick Quick Quick Quick 
Fixed costs None None High (subscription 
to the provider) 
High 
Transaction cost N/A Low Low Low 
Fraud risk High Low Low if encrypted High 
Transaction 
Time 
Quick Quick N/A Quick 
Non refutable No No No No 
Security Low High High if encrypted Low 
Unobtrusive No (enter name 
and card number) 
Yes Yes No (enter name 
and card number) 
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Table 5-11: Attributes of a credit card transaction for the merchant 
 On-line 
authorization 
Encrypted 
Transfer 
Distant 
database 
Result of 
combination 
Computation Low Medium Low Medium 
User interface N/A N/A N/A None 
Communication Low Medium Low Medium 
Time Medium Quick Quick Medium 
Fixed costs High None High 
(subscription to 
the provider) 
High 
Transaction cost Medium Low Low Medium 
Fraud risk Low  Low Low if 
encrypted 
Low 
Transaction 
Time 
Medium Quick N/A Medium 
Non refutable Yes No No No 
Security High High High if 
encrypted 
High 
Unobtrusive Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 5-12: Privacy characteristics a the credit card system 
WHAT THEY KNOW  
Identity of buyer Identity of 
seller 
Amount of 
transaction 
Time and 
place of 
transaction 
Nature of 
transaction 
Identifiable N/A Merchant ID Buyer 
Traceable N/A Merchant ID 
Everything Everything Everything 
Identifiable Name/credit card 
number 
N/A 
Seller 
Traceable Name/credit card 
number 
N/A 
Everything Everything Everything 
Issuer Everything Everything Amount Time Nothing 
Bank Acquirer Name/credit card 
number 
Everything Amount Time Nothing 
Central authority Name/credit card 
number 
Everything Amount Time Nothing W
H
O
 
K
N
O
W
S 
Observer 
Nothing if 
encrypted, 
Name/credit card 
number if not 
Merchant ID Nothing if 
encrypted, 
Amount if 
not 
Time Partial 
 
Credit card systems are used commonly on the Internet and for many types of electronic 
transactions. This system offers many different ways to personalize the transaction, 
resulting in different attributes. The main modifications can be done on Authentication, 
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Authorization and Transfer. This can change the speed of the transaction and the security 
/ fraud attributes of the system. 
Privacy is almost not affected by these modifications, due to the fact that the interactions 
between the merchant and the credit card network involve exchanging a lot of 
information about the payer. To deeply modify privacy attributes, the system needs to be 
redesigned, which is a much more difficult problem. This is due to the fact that interfaces 
and messages exchanged cannot be changed a lot, which limit customizations. SET tries 
to address this issue by redesigning the interfaces between the payer and the merchant, 
and between the merchant and the network. This again is a limitation of the primitive. 
However, designing the payer’ s and the payee’ s software with primitives makes it much 
easier to modify their behavior. 
5.3 PayPal 
PayPal29 is a company that was created in 1998. It serves about 15 million registered 
users. It is an account-transfer system. 
The idea is that users have a PayPal account, maintained by PayPal, on which they can 
add money by paying off-line with their credit card. Each account earns a rate of return 
on the account balance. This helps money to stay within the system. 
Anyone can send money to anybody by just giving to PayPal the recipient’ s email 
address and the amount to be transferred. PayPal then sends the recipient an email in 
which there is an identification code. If the recipient is not yet registered on PayPal, he 
has to create a new PayPal account to retrieve the money. 
It is possible to recover “ real”  money from the PayPal server through checks or direct 
deposit transactions. A personal account is free; nevertheless, users have to choose a 
premium service if they wish to send more than $1000 per six months to their bank 
account. 
                                                 
29
 http://www.paypal.com  
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Figure 5-6: The PayPal scheme 
Figure 5-6 shows how the PayPal schemes works. In the PayPal system, every transaction 
is made in PayPal money. Users can transfer this money to or from their bank account. 
However, PayPal encourages users to keep as much money as possible on their account. 
Because this creates strong positive externalities, PayPal can get interest from the money 
deposited and avoids making repetitive money transfer to users’  real bank accounts.  
PayPal is fairly secure because every payment is made through the PayPal’ s server. When 
a payer pays a payee, PayPal directly credits the payee’ s account and sends an email to 
the payee to acknowledge the payment. The payee does not have to do anything to accept 
a payment. Therefore, the money transfer is done only on PayPal servers, and the payee 
cannot access personal information of the payer. Moreover, only PayPal knows financial 
details of the payer.  
The link to the “ real world”  is done via users’  real bank account. For security, PayPal can 
make a money transfer only to the user’ s bank account.  
 
PayPal is a very simple way of sending money between two individuals. It is symmetric 
(payer and payee’ s roles are interchangeable) and relatively easy to use. It is one of the 
few electronic transaction systems that has had a success compared to other transaction 
schemes designed for the Internet. Most of PayPal transactions come from eBay.com.  
 
Results / Examples 
 - 135 - 
PayPal can handle small payments down to one penny. Although PayPal allows transfers 
of any amount, this system would not be efficient if too many payments were of small 
value. In effect, it is not designed for handling small value payments. If PayPal were to be 
used as a micropayment scheme, it would have to deal with too many requests, and this 
would be inefficient. Therefore, it is not fitted to be a micropayment scheme.  
5.3.1 Primitives of a PayPal transaction 
A PayPal transaction is very asymmetric: the payer has to log in and to make the 
payment, while the payee has only to receive an email. This email does not convey any 
critical information. It is only an acknowledgement of the payment sent to the payer. The 
loss of the email does not jeopardize the payment.  
In this section, we will go over the primitives involved in a PayPal transaction for the 
payer and the payee.  
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Figure 5-7: The PayPal primitives 
 
Figure 5-7 shows the roles of primitives in a PayPal transaction. In the following 
sections, we will go over the primitives involved in a PayPal transaction between a payer 
and a payee. Only the payer and the payee will be considered here. The payer is assumed 
to have already a PayPal account and to have enough money on the account to complete 
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the transaction. The initialization of the system involves human interaction and is 
performed only once. It is not examined here. 
 Authentication 
Authentication is done via a login and a password on a SSL30 connection. It could be 
possible to modify this authentication to login automatically (the client implementation 
knows the login / password information and can login on the user’ s behalf automatically). 
The user may choose this solution if the client is going to conduct a lot of transactions on 
the user’ s behalf, and the user does not want to be prompted for a login and a password 
repeatedly. There is of course a trade-off with security, because if the device is stolen, the 
thief can send himself money from the user’ s account.  
It would be also possible to strengthen the authentication by requiring a stronger 
authentication from the user, like biometrics. In this case, the device would ask the user 
for the authenticating action and would login with the user’ s login and password if the 
authentication was successful. Other types of devices, like signet rings, could also be 
used. 
Table 5-13: Attributes of primitive Authentication 
 Authentication with 
PIN code 
Automatic 
Authentication 
Strengthened 
authentication 
Computation Low High High 
User interface Device to enter login 
and password 
None Depends, e.g. 
fingerprint reader 
Communication Low Low Low 
Time Medium Quick Medium 
Fixed costs None None Device’ s cost 
Transaction cost None None None 
Fraud risk Low  Medium Low 
Transaction Time Medium Quick Medium 
Non refutable No No No 
Security Medium Low High 
Unobtrusive No (enter login and 
password) 
Yes No 
 
                                                 
30
 SSL: Secure Socket Layer, used to secure communications on the Internet 
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On a privacy standpoint, the payer cannot learn anything at this point. However, PayPal 
knows very well who was authenticated and can trace the user to personal information 
that is already stored on PayPal servers.  
 Authorization 
On the payer’ s side, there is no real authorization. On the payee’ s side, the payment is 
authorized as soon as PayPal sends a confirmation email. This confirmation emails 
includes the email address of the payer, which is the only information accessible by the 
payee.  
 Transfer 
On the payer’ s side, transfer represents the transfer of the amount and of the email 
address of the payee.  
On the payee’ s side, the transfer represents the reception of the confirmation email. 
As the central authority, PayPal needs to know all the payment details such as payer, 
payee, amount, and time. However, PayPal cannot learn anything about the nature of the 
transaction. 
Table 5-14: Privacy characteristics of the transfer primitive of PayPal 
WHAT THEY KNOW  
Identity of buyer Identity of 
seller 
Amount of 
transaction 
Time and 
place of 
transaction 
Nature of 
transaction 
Identifiable N/A Payee’ s email Buyer 
Traceable N/A Payee’ s email 
Everything Everything Everything 
Identifiable Payer’ s email N/A Seller 
Traceable Payer’ s email N/A 
Everything Everything Everything 
Issuer Aggregated flow 
of money 
Nothing Amount Time Nothing 
Bank Acquirer Nothing Aggregated 
flow of 
money 
Amount Time Nothing 
Central authority 
(PayPal) 
Everything Everything Amount Time Nothing W
H
O
 
K
N
O
W
S 
Observer 
Payer’ s email if 
email not 
encrypted 
Payee’ s email 
if email not 
encrypted 
Nothing  Time Nothing 
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 Record keeping 
As in other cases, record keeping can be made online or offline, or both. PayPal keeps a 
record of all transactions. Users can choose to keep a local record for each transaction, or 
to trust PayPal to do it for them.  
Table 5-15: Attributes of Record Keeping 
 Local database Distant database 
Computation Low Low 
User interface N/A N/A 
Communication None Low 
Time Quick Slow 
Fixed costs None None 
Transaction cost None Low 
Fraud risk None Low 
Transaction Time Quick Slow 
Non refutable N/A N/A 
Security N/A High 
Unobtrusive Yes Yes 
 
As in the credit card system, privacy is not much affected by this primitive. PayPal learns 
a lot about actions of users. PayPal knows about who users transact with, when, what the 
amounts are. Nevertheless, PayPal cannot learn anything about the nature of the 
transaction. 
The more users transact with PayPal, the more precise are users’  profiles accessible to 
PayPal. Moreover, if the database is compromised, the personal information will not be 
private anymore. However, there is no way to prevent PayPal to build this database. 
PayPal even need this database to detect and fight fraudulent actions. 
 Aggregation 
There is no aggregation made by users in the PayPal system. The PayPal system could be 
considered aggregating payments between the deposit of money on PayPal accounts and 
the transfer of money to real bank accounts.  
 Timing 
There is no timing made by users in the PayPal system. 
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5.3.2 Summary 
Table 5-16 summarizes the attributes of the most common implementations of each 
primitive. Table 5-17 lists the privacy characteristics of the PayPal system. 
Table 5-16: Attributes of PayPal 
 Authentication with 
PIN code 
Distant database Result of 
combination 
Computation Low Low Low 
User interface Device to enter login 
and password 
N/A Keyboard 
Communication Low Low Low 
Time Medium Medium Medium 
Fixed costs None None None 
Transaction cost None None None 
Fraud risk Low  Low Low 
Transaction Time Medium Medium Medium 
Non refutable No N/A No 
Security Medium High Medium 
Unobtrusive No (enter login and 
password) 
Yes No (enter login and 
password) 
 
Table 5-17: Privacy characteristics of PayPal 
WHAT THEY KNOW  
Identity of buyer Identity of 
seller 
Amount of 
transaction 
Time and 
place of 
transaction 
Nature of 
transaction 
Identifiable N/A Payee’ s email Buyer 
Traceable N/A Payee’ s email 
Everything Everything Everything 
Identifiable Payer’ s email N/A Seller 
Traceable Payer’ s email N/A 
Everything Everything Everything 
Issuer Aggregated flow 
of money 
Nothing Amount Time Nothing 
Bank Acquirer Nothing Aggregated 
flow of 
money 
Amount Time Nothing 
Central authority 
(PayPal) 
Everything Everything Amount Time Nothing W
H
O
 
K
N
O
W
S 
Observer 
Payer’ s email if 
email not 
encrypted 
Payee’ s email 
if email not 
encrypted 
Nothing  Time Nothing 
 
PayPal is a system based on a single central authority, and is therefore very difficult to 
customize without modifying the protocols set by the central authority. Nevertheless, it is 
  Chapter 5 
 - 140 - 
possible to modify the authentication and the record keeping primitives so that they act 
differently and have different attributes. The success of PayPal is due to its simplicity. 
The complexity of PayPal is in its sophisticated payment server, but not in the 
interactions with users. Therefore, the interfaces with this server are well defined, and 
this simplicity is also the reason why only few modifications can be done. 
5.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, three important types of electronic payments have been decomposed into 
the primitives defined in chapter 4. This decomposition allows modifications of some of 
these primitive and of their attributes. DigiCash supports some modifications of its 
transfer and authorization primitives. Credit card systems supports a lot more 
modifications, in particular in the primitives authentication, authorization, transfer and 
record keeping. PayPal, a successful payment system on the Internet, can support 
modifications of its authorization and record-keeping primitives.  
 
Table 5-18 compares the attributes of the three payment systems examined in this 
chapter: DigiCash, credit cards and PayPal. 
Table 5-18: Comparisons of attributes of DigiCash, Credit Cards and PayPal 
 DigiCash Credit Cards PayPal 
Computation High Medium Low 
User interface N/A None Keyboard 
Communication Low Medium Low 
Time Quick Quick Slow 
Fixed costs None High None 
Transaction cost Low Low None 
Fraud risk Low High Low 
Transaction Time Quick Quick Slow 
Non refutable Yes No No 
Security High Low Medium 
Unobtrusive Yes No (enter name and 
card number) 
No (enter login and 
password) 
 
DigiCash requires more computation power because of the cryptographic features of this 
scheme. This provides also greater security. Credit Cards and PayPal requires input from 
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the user. This can be modified by changing the implementation of the primitives 
according to the previous sections.  
When comparing Table 5-3, Table 5-12, Table 5-17, which are respectively listing the 
privacy properties of DigiCash, Credit cards an PayPal, we can balance the type of 
information released to some of the parties. DigiCash has of course the better privacy 
record, because of its design allowing fully anonymous transactions. PayPal users release 
information mainly to the PayPal server, thus providing fairly good privacy properties, if 
users trust the central server. Credit cards are not doing so well because of the 
information that the payer has to release to the merchant before a transaction (name and 
credit card number), letting the merchant learn a lot of personal details about the user. 
 
The framework of Primitives provides a good way to analyze payment systems and their 
characteristics. This decomposition seems to work well in very different systems. 
Complex systems such as credit cards support many ways to conduct a payment, and 
therefore are much easier to modify thanks to the primitives. However, simpler systems, 
or very rigid systems that do not allow much personalization are much more difficult to 
modify. This is due to the fact that the framework presented here does not allow 
modification of the scheme on a high level. It is limited to the devices of individual 
players of a transaction. Interfaces have to remain unchanged, and this limits greatly the 
scope of modifications. Deeply modifying attributes of these schemes would require a 
modification of the complete system and not only of the primitives of the payer or the 
payee. The interfaces would need to provide more flexibility in order to allow more 
possible implementations and more flexibility for users. The strength of primitives lies in 
the possibility to dynamically modify the characteristics of a system depending on user 
preferences. There would be two ways to extend this framework: first, it is possible to 
design payment systems in such a way that multiple interfaces between parties are 
possible. In this case, the parties would have to first negotiate to decide which interface 
they will use during the transaction, and then decide which implementation 
corresponding to the chosen interface they will use internally. Second, it may be possible 
to improve the framework of primitive to allow automatic negotiation of the interfaces. 
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In conclusion, the framework of primitives seems to be a good way to analyze and to 
compare payment systems, and allow users to easily conduct small changes to their 
system, thanks to the modularity and the description of differences it provides. 
Nevertheless, it lacks some power to greatly modify payments attributes, as it cannot act 
on the interfaces regulating exchanges between parties. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
This thesis has addressed the problem of supporting a wide range of payment schemes in 
a single wireless communications device, the Personal Router. The approach taken has 
been the development of a set of building blocks, or primitives. To conclude this thesis, 
this chapter first summarizes the major findings of this work and proposes several areas 
of future work that would extend and improve the analysis presented here. 
6.1 Findings 
This section gives a summary of key results of this thesis. 
 Primitives can support three of the payment systems 
The framework of primitives, presented in chapter 4, is a response to the issues raised in 
chapters 2 and 3. Through a modularization of elemental operations of payment systems, 
it is possible to provide a better way of defining and comparing payment systems.  
There are two major advantages to this approach. First, comparing two payment systems 
is difficult, and would be even more difficult to do automatically. This framework 
provides a way to compare sub-elements of payment systems, thus making comparisons 
much easier to perform. Second, it becomes possible to interchange a sub-part of a 
payment system for another, which gives a way to easily modify the characteristics of a 
payment scheme. This could even lead to a way to build payment schemes as results of 
negotiations between payers and payees.  
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The primitives defined in section 4.3 are Authentication, Authorization, Transfer, Record 
keeping, Aggregation, and Timing.  
In chapter 5, it is demonstrated that this framework can successfully decompose 3 very 
different payment systems, which are DigiCash, the credit card system, and PayPal.  
 The framework of primitives provides a way to modify payment systems 
on local user’s device… 
In chapter 5, three payment systems are reviewed and broken down into their primitive 
elements as defined in chapter 4. These three payment systems are DigiCash, the credit 
card system, and PayPal.  
DigiCash is an electronic cash system, providing full anonymity to users. After the study 
of its primitive both on the payer’ s and the payee’ s side, two main modifications of the 
primitives have been pointed out: first, a modification of the transfer primitive, allowing 
to change the privacy characteristics of the scheme, following the user’ s preferences 
when full anonymity is not a desirable property; second, a modification of the 
authorization primitive of the payee providing a way to receive an off-line payment in 
exchange for a higher fraud risk. 
Credit card systems are one of the most common payment systems on the Internet. As 
there are many different ways to use credit cards, there are also more possibilities to 
modify the scheme. Several implementations are presented. Several modifications 
concerning the primitives authentication, authorization and transfer are proposed. Privacy 
is not much affected by these modifications, because the scheme requires that users 
present their credit card number and name to merchants, who then transmit this 
information to the credit card network. 
PayPal is a very successful payment system on the Internet. Its size and its number of 
subscribers makes it one a the most important players in the market of electronic 
payments over the Internet. Its scheme makes it very easy to transfer money from any 
user to any other user; contrary to the credit card system, there is no need to be registered 
as a merchant to be able to receive a payment.  
As PayPal is very standardized and simple, it is not easy to modify. Possible 
modifications are proposed for the primitives authentication and record keeping.  
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The framework of primitives has been successful in breaking down those three payment 
systems into sub-elements. The true test of primitives will be their adaptability to new 
payment schemes that could be invented in the future. 
 … But lacks strength to change the whole system, because of fixed 
interfaces 
The framework of primitives facilitates the analysis of a scheme and the comparisons. It 
also allows users to select between different implementations of these primitives to 
slightly modify the behavior and the characteristics of payment systems.  
However, as this framework is only used independently of the other parties, it lacks the 
possibility to deeply modify a payment scheme by involving the entire set of players in 
the modification process. Therefore, modifications are limited to a reduced set of 
possibilities. This is due to the fact that interfaces regulating the exchanges between 
parties and the sequence of these exchanges cannot be modified. Therefore, the behavior 
of the actors cannot be changed in depth.  
It could be possible to modify payment systems to allow important modifications. There 
could be two ways to do that: first, by designing payment systems directly with the 
framework of primitives and pre-designed interfaces that users could choose from out of 
a negotiation; another method, more difficult, would be to create a framework that would 
let users negotiate on interfaces and interactions necessary to conduct a transaction.  
 Privacy is a major characteristic of payment systems; in this 
context, it can be more easily analyzed with the use of privacy 
tables 
Privacy must be analyzed by the information considered and the parties accessing the 
information. What kind of information is released? Is it a name, a pseudonym, a user ID? 
Is this information obtained by the bank, by the merchant, or by an observer? Privacy 
issues are multidimensional. In effect, it is much too simplistic to describe a system as 
private or not. In fact, only a few payment schemes, such as DigiCash, can claim to be 
fully anonymous, thus being private.  
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When evaluating the privacy characteristics of a system, different properties must be 
defined. First, anonymity and traceability must be differentiated. Pseudonymity must also 
be defined. Some schemes provide a way to revoke anonymity in specific cases such as 
law enforcement. These terms are discussed in section 2.2.13. 
Section 2.2.13 also proposes to use a privacy table, used to analyze privacy 
characteristics of payment systems. This table proposed has two axes. The first one lists 
the type of information being released, and the other one lists the party it is released to. 
This table is an efficient way of summarizing clearly the privacy requirements and 
preferences of users, and the privacy characteristics of payment systems. By comparing 
the user preferences with the privacy properties of schemes, it is possible to make 
machines reason about privacy. 
However, a lot of work needs to be done in the field of smart agents and user interface to 
support the complexity of the information presented in this privacy table. 
6.2 Future Research and Open Issues 
 Privacy 
Chapter 3 has given an overview of the potentially difficult questions raised by the 
Personal Router. It also lists three areas of threats, and states some solutions that have 
been proposed. But the place taken by the Personal Router is much more complex than 
the mere addition of these three worlds. The combination of these threats and the risks of 
collusion between players will require a deeper analysis of the probable risks and of the 
solutions that can be applied. It is true that other mobile communication means such as 
third generation mobile networks with data capabilities will raise a number of similar 
questions. But the Personal Router adds the perspective of a large number of providers, 
which will change the threat model. 
 User Interface 
The issue of user interface has not been approached at all in this thesis and is absolutely 
essential for this framework to work. In effect, in order to use this framework, users will 
need to define fairly precisely what their preferences are. It would be wrong to believe 
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that users will go through the attributes defined in this thesis and precisely specify what 
they want. It is more likely that they will not understand the meanings of the chosen 
attributes. In particular, privacy, as a multidimensional attribute very sensitive to context, 
will be difficult to analyze.  
Therefore, these attributes can only be defined through a smart user interface able to 
understand and learn the will of users and the context in which they are acting. The most 
promising approach seems to be the observation of the user’ s behavior. The decision 
maker algorithm used to decide which payment system to use and how it should be used 
according to users’  guidelines is also an open issue that will have to be researched. This 
decision maker algorithm should be able to learn from the user and should have a good 
user interface allowing users to teach it their preferences and to control the decisions of 
this algorithm. 
 Negotiation 
More generally, the Personal Router will need a negotiation interface, capable of 
negotiating not only for the services, in terms of bandwidth, quality of service and delay, 
but also for the terms of the contract (in terms of payment scheme chosen, price, 
information revealed, modification made to the payment scheme, etc). Once again, this 
negotiation agent will also need a very good user interface to let users express what they 
want and to simplify the complexity of the users’  requirements. It is particularly 
important given the fact that it is likely that the Personal Router will need to negotiate 
and pay for connectivity without the active participation of the user. 
 The Framework of Primitives 
Finally, this framework could be extended to include deeper changes and maybe the 
possibility to create new payment systems. In this thesis, it is limited to partial 
modifications on parts of the system. Therefore, the proposed framework cannot modify 
fundamental characteristics of the system. It has to be supported by a fixed structure of 
the payment system. This greatly limits the modularity of the framework.  
It may be possible to extend the approach presented in this thesis to the whole payment 
system and all the players. In this case, the whole system would be able to evolve and to 
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modify itself depending on inputs and requirements of parties engaged in the transaction. 
Ultimately, it could even be possible to build for each transaction a new payment scheme 
that would perfectly fit the wishes of the parties involved. 
 Composing primitives into payment systems 
In the presented framework, primitives are only applied to existing payment systems. The 
aim is here to compare payment system, and to apply small modifications. However, it 
could also be possible to build payment system from this set of primitives. In this case, a 
composition system should be created to first implement a way to create new payment 
systems, and then to verify that the created payment scheme is valid and works properly.  
 Legal requirements for applying the framework to a payment 
system as a whole 
Payment systems deal with money, and thus provide a highly sensitive service. Legal 
requirements on payment systems are already complicated. But what would happen if 
those payment systems could be partially modified as result of negotiation between 
users? Another issue is the choice of a payment system as a contract. Parties would enter 
in a contract, and this raises issues, among others, of digital signatures, digital legal 
bindings, and of choice of laws. 
Such a system could not be widely accepted without a good understanding of its legal 
implications.  
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